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1Much has been written about the impact of new digital technologies on individual
privacy generally.  See, e.g., Anne Wells Branscomb, Who Owns Information?  From Privacy to
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It has become commonplace to say that we have entered the age of information.  The
words conjure up images of a reader’s paradise — an era of limitless access to information
resources and unlimited interpersonal communication.  In truth, however, the new information
age is turning out to be as much an age of information about readers as an age of information for
readers.  The same technologies that have made vast amounts of information accessible in digital
form are enabling information providers to amass an unprecedented wealth of data about who
their customers are and what they like to read.  In the new age of digitally transmitted
information, the simple, formerly anonymous acts of reading, listening, and viewing — scanning
an advertisement or a short news item, browsing through an online novel or a collection of video
clips — can be made to speak volumes, including, quite possibly, information that the reader
would prefer not to share.
This Article focuses specifically on digital monitoring of individual reading habits for
purposes of so-called “copyright management” in cyberspace, and evaluates the import of this
monitoring for traditional notions of freedom of thought and expression.1  A fundamental
-2-
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COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 13 (1995); Symposium, Data Protection Law and the European
Union’s Directive:  The Challenge for the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 431 (1995); see
also Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters:  The Tension Between Privacy and
Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U.
 
PA. L. REV. 1, 3-11 (1991) (predicting that the modern
“information explosion” will exacerbate existing tensions in constitutional privacy doctrine). 
This Article will not revisit that ground, but will focus more specifically on the relationship
between privacy, anonymity, and freedom of thought and expression.  As used in this Article,
“reading” includes viewing and listening.
assumption underlying our discourse about the activities of reading, thinking, and speech is that
individuals in our society are guaranteed the freedom to form their thoughts and opinions in
privacy, free from intrusive oversight by governmental or private entities.  The new copyright
management technologies force us to examine anew the sources and extent of that freedom.
Part I of this Article describes the various copyright management technologies that are
being developed to enable copyright owners to monitor readers’ activities in cyberspace and the
uses they make of reading materials acquired there.  Part II provides an overview of proposed
federal legislation designed to reinforce copyright owners’ power unilaterally to institute
intrusive copyright management systems.  Part III considers, and rejects, the possibility that the
impending digital copyright management regime constitutes no more than legitimate private
ordering regarding the terms and conditions of access to copyrighted works.  Part IV discusses
the sources and justifications for an individual right to read anonymously, and argues that reading
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2See, e.g., Economic Indicators, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 24, 1996, at 110 (number of
Internet hosts growing at 85% annually, and number of multi-media World Wide Web pages
growing at 2500% annually).
3Consistent with the planned extraction of royalties on a per-use basis, copyright owners
and developers of copyright management systems refer to the initial transaction in the
copyrighted work as a “license” rather than a sale.  Whether purveyors of copyrighted works held
out for mass-market purchase may characterize consumer transactions as licenses to justify
imposing more restrictive terms than allowed by copyright law is hotly debated, as is the larger
question whether copyright law and the substantive policies it embodies preempt certain contract
terms outright.  See, e.g. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453-55 (concluding that
contract terms ordinarily will not be preempted) (7th Cir. 1996); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual
Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S.
 
CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995); David A. Rice, Public
Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy:  Federal Preemption of Software License
Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U.
 
PITT. L. REV. 543 (1992).  The proposed
Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code, which is intended to cover licensing of intangibles,
makes no reference to this these debates.  See Draft Revised Article 2B:  Licenses, available
is so intimately connected with speech and freedom of thought that the First Amendment should
be understood to guarantee such a right.  Part V suggests that proposed federal protection for
digital copyright management technologies may be unconstitutional to the extent that it penalizes
individuals who seek only to exercise their rights to read anonymously, or to enable others to do
so.  Finally, Part VI argues that rather than seeking to enshrine a set of practices designed to
negate reader anonymity, Congress should, instead, adopt comprehensive legislation designed to
shield individual reading habits from scrutiny.
I.
  
THE NEW COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGIES
The amount of copyrighted material available online has grown exponentially in the last
few years, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.2  The same technologies that
enable readers to access digitally stored works, however, also enable copyright owners to
generate precise and detailed records of such access.  Copyright owners then can use that data,
together with other new technological tools, to monitor on a continuing basis, and extract
additional royalties for, readers’ subsequent uses of the works they have acquired.3  Thus, for
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online <http://www.lawlib.uh.edu/ucc2b/0503/0503_2b.html.>  This Article will not address the
question of copyright preemption of license terms, except to note that the answer will affect
significantly the range of copyright management practices a copyright owner may lawfully adopt. 
See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
4See Mary Grace Smith & Robert Weber, A New Set of Rules for Information Commerce
— Rights-Protection Technologies and Personalized-Information Commerce Will Affect All
Knowledge Workers, COMM. WEEK, Nov. 6, 1995, at 34; Mark Stefik, Letting Loose the Light: 
Igniting Commerce in Electronic Publication, in MARK STEFIK, ED., INTERNET DREAMS: 
ARCHETYPES, MYTHS, AND METAPHORS 3 (forthcoming MIT Press 1996); Robert Weber, Digital
Rights Management Technologies, available online <http://www.ncri.com/articles/
rights_management/> (describing desired functions and capabilities of a copyright management
system and surveying available technologies and providers).
5See CHRISTOPHER BURNS, COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT AND THE NII:  REPORT TO THE
ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS (1995);
Charles Clark, The Publisher in the Digital World, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
NEW TECHNOLOGIES:  PROCEEDINGS OF THE KNOWRIGHT ‘95 CONFERENCE 85, 96-101 (1995);
Smith & Weber, supra note 4; Stefik, supra note 4; Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible:  How
Digital Property Rights Challenge Us To Rethink Digital Publishing (1996) (unpublished paper
on file with author); Steve G. Steinberg, Software Metering, WIRED 3.07, July 1995, at 137;
Steve G. Steinberg, Tracking Usage Rights, WIRED 3.07, July 1995, at 140; Steve G. Steinberg,
Digital Watermarks, WIRED 3.07, July 1995, at 141; Weber, supra note 4; see also John Perry
example, if I purchase a collection of essays online, the copyright owner can charge me for the
file containing the essays, generate a record of my identity and what I purchased, and insert
pieces of microcode into the file that will:  (1) notify the copyright owner every time I “open”
one of the essays and specify which one I opened; (2) notify me when I must remit additional
fees to the copyright owner — this much to browse the essay, this much to print it out, this much
to extract an excerpt, and so on; and (3) prevent me from opening, printing, or excerpting the
piece until I have paid.  Together, these new digital monitoring and metering technologies define
the burgeoning field of “copyright management.”4  Within the last two years, a copyright
management industry has begun to emerge, directed at the development of integrated systems
that can not only conduct online transactions and generate customer records, but also implement
desired technological and pricing restrictions on subsequent uses of copyrighted works.5
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Barlow, The Economy of Ideas:  A Framework for Rethinking Patents and Copyrights in the
Digital Age, WIRED 2.03 March 1994, at 84, 129; Esther Dyson, Intellectual Value, WIRED 3.07,
July 1995, at 136, 139, 184.
6See, e.g., On-Line Security Issues:  Hearings on S. 1726 Before the Subcomm. on
Science, Technology and Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.
(June 12, 1996) (statement of Jack Valenti, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Motion
Picture Association of America, Inc.), available online WESTLAW, USTestimony database;
National Information Infrastructure:  Hearings on S 1284 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 7, 1996) (statement of Kenneth R. Kay, Executive
Director, Creative Incentive Coalition), available online WESTLAW, USTestimony database;
Copyright Protection on the Internet:  Hearings on H.R 2441 Before the Subcomm. on Courts
and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 7,
1996) (statements of the Association of American Publishers; Barbara A. Munder, Senior Vice
President, The McGraw-Hill Companies; Frances W. Preston, President and CEO, Broadcast
Music, Inc.; Jack Valenti, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Motion Picture Association of
America, Inc.), available online WESTLAW, USTestimony database; Creative Incentive
Coalition, Ten Myths About the NII Copyright Protection Act (1996), available online
http:/www.cic.org/myths.html; see also U.S.
 
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE:  THE REPORT OF
THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 10-12, 177-78, 230 (1995)
[hereinafter NII WHITE PAPER].
7Weber, supra note 4, § 3.1.1; see also BURNS, supra note 5, at 17-21, 31-35; Clark,
supra note 5, at 97-99; Stefik, supra note 4, at 14-24; Steinberg, Software Metering, supra note
5; Steinberg, Usage Rights, supra note 5.
As justification for the development of digital copyright management systems, copyright
owners cite the ease of reproducing and transmitting unauthorized copies of digital works over
electronic networks.  They argue that technological protection for their works is necessary to
prevent widespread infringement, thus giving them the incentive to make their works available
online.6  As the above example suggests, however, many copyright owners envision copyright
management systems that will be capable of doing far more than simply preventing unauthorized
reproduction.  One study of existing technologies for copyright management characterizes the
ideal technology as “capable of detecting, preventing, and counting a wide range of operations,
including open, print, export, copying, modifying, excerpting, and so on.”7  In addition, the wish
-6-
8Weber, supra note 4, § 3.2.
9See, e.g., BURNS, supra note 5, at 32 (“In addition to regulating access to the local
database, the systems capture a record of what the user actually looked at, copied or printed, and
this usage record is sent to the clearinghouse when the user seeks additional access, at the end of
a billing period or whenever the user runs out of credit.”); Smith & Weber, supra note 4, at
36-37.
10It could also entail the demise of the fair use doctrine.  See Pamela Samuelson, The
Copyright Grab, WIRED 4.01, Jan. 1996, at 134.  However, that is a subject for another article.
11See Alan Wexelblat, How Is the NII Like A Prison?, available online
<http://wex.www.media.mit.edu/people/wex/panoptic-paper.html> (characterizing profilers’ goal
list continues, the copyright management system should maintain “records indicating which
permissions ha[ve] actually been granted and to whom.”8  The system can then create a record
each time the work is used and notify the copyright owner if additional “usage rights” are
sought.9  This vision of the future of copyright management could entail total loss of reader
anonymity in cyberspace.10
In addition to using new digital technologies to exert continuing control over readers’
uses of digital works, some copyright owners may use the transaction records generated by their
copyright management systems to learn more about their customers through a process known as
“profiling.”  The activity of profiling, per se, is not new.  It is a well-established practice through
which businesses of all types seek to learn as much as possible about customers who show
interest in their products or services.  For transactions that occur in “real” (as opposed to digital)
space, however, the ability to profile one’s customer base is limited to some extent by customers’
willingness to self-report — for example, by filling out product registration cards.  In contrast,
profiling in the digital age holds out, for the first time, the tantalizing promise of “perfect”
information, because digital communications can be structured to create detailed records of
consumer purchases and reading activities.11
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as “the panoptic sort,” an “information collection and use regime” that will enable perfect
prediction of individual conduct); see generally GANDY, supra note 1.  In cyberspace, of course,
“perfect” information is a myth.  Email addresses may be shared by families or even by
co-workers, so that it may be impossible to assemble accurate demographic profiles.  However,
that is unlikely to deter digital profilers from trying.
12See, e.g., Mitch Betts, Privacy Fades for Web Visitors:  Lust for Data, New Tracking
Techniques Dog Users, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 25, 1995, at 162; Steve Moore, Internet
Security Split:  Let the Browser Beware, COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 28, 1995, at 59; Froomkin,
supra note 1, at 484-88.  Industry commentators refer to such Web site “hits” as “mouse
droppings.”  See, e.g., Larry Irving, Progress Report on the Information Superhighway:  Privacy
High on the Fed’s Priority List — Surprised?, MACWORLD, Mar. 1996, at 260.
13See, e.g., Betts, supra note 12 (describing “DejaNews” search tool that allows retrieval
of individuals’ postings to Usenet discussion groups); Forbes ASAP, How Smart Agents Will
Change Selling, FORBES, Aug. 28, 1995, at 95; Debra Aho Williamson, Smart Agents Build
Brains Into Net Ads:  More Companies Tap Technology to Better Target Web Users Who Visit
Their Sites, ADVERTIZING AGE, Apr. 8, 1996, at 26.
14See Reidenberg, supra note 1, at 200-06 & n.42 (“Random House is testing a database
that enables it to send specialized mail order catalogs to customers with specific reading
preferences.”); Reidenberg & Gamet-Pol, supra note 1, at 112, 121-22; Dan Richman, Data
Mining Chisels Its Niche, COMPUTER WORLD, Jan. 29, 1996, at 49 (explaining general principles
of data mining); Froomkin, supra note 1, at 481-88 (describing the convergence of sophisticated
data mining techniques with the increased availability of data pertaining to individual histories,
At its most crude, profiling might consist of gathering basic demographic information
about readers who “visit” a copyright owner’s site on the World Wide Web and/or acquire digital
copies of copyrighted works made available there.  When I pay for the collection of essays, my
electronic mail address and, if applicable, credit card information, furnish some information
about my identity.12  More sophisticated reader profiling is made possible by the use of intelligent
“search agents” that comb the World Wide Web for other information about me — other things I
have purchased, discussion groups and news groups to which I belong, and so on.13  The
copyright owner may also use complex “data mining” techniques that analyze its customer
database, together with personal data purchased or acquired from other sources, to identify
patterns or correlations that might illuminate the preferences of particular types of customers.14 
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purchasing patterns, and reading habits); U.S.
 
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, PRIVACY AND THE NII: 
SAFEGUARDING TELECOMMUNICATIONS-RELATED PERSONAL INFORMATION app. (1995)
[hereinafter NTIA
 
PRIVACY REPORT] (same); Wexelblat, supra note 11, at 2-4 (same).
15See Froomkin, supra note 1, at 415-20, 459-70.
16See Smith & Weber, supra note 4, at 36 (“To protect the privacy of individuals . . . the
usage data can be aggregated or made anonymous before it reaches rights holders.”);Weber,
supra note 4, S2.5.2.1; cf. Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy and Intelligent Transportation
Technology, 11 SANTA CLARA CPTR. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 151, 181-83 (1995) (observing that the
most effective way to protect individual privacy in the digital age is to design technological tools
so that they prevent or limit the identification of individuals).
The copyright owner can then use the information it has amassed about my tastes and purchasing
habits to market other works to me.  It can also sell the information to third parties.
None of these intrusions need occur.  A digital copyright management system could
perform the essential continuing control functions while still preserving reader anonymity.  At its
most basic, such a system might simply provide pricing information, negotiate the purchase
transaction, and release a copy of the work for downloading to the customer’s computer —
without generating permanent customer records at all.  While some consumers might choose to
pay for digital works with credit cards, thereby revealing their identities, others might opt for
some form of anonymous-payer digital cash.15  Even for credit card purchases, the copyright
owner could design a system that would retain records of user identities only until payment is
received and/or that would deny copyright owners the ability to extract the individualized
transaction data necessary to conduct reader profiling.  Getting slightly more complicated, one
could also imagine a remote debit system that would simply extract an additional, but
anonymous, payment from the reader each time the work is used in a designated way.16  Finally,
to prevent unauthorized copying, the copyright owner could simply insert a piece of microcode in
every copy of a digital work that would automatically bar the reader from making perfect
-9-
17See, e.g., Stefik, supra note 4, at 31; Stefik, supra note 5, at 4.
18See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1002.  Without the required modifications, digital audio
recording devices can produce near-perfect copies of musical recordings.  The “serial copy
management” provisions were added to the Copyright Act to prevent the development of a
market in unauthorized “perfect” second-generation recordings.  See H.R.
 
REP. NO. 102-873(II),
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3578, 3601.  The provisions
were drafted to exclude computers and computer programs from the definitions of “digital audio
recording medium” and “digital musical recording.”  17 U.S.C. § 1001(4)(B)(ii), (5)(B)(ii); see
138 CONG. REC. H9029, H9033 (statement of Rep. William Hughes, then-chairman of the
Subcommittee on Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee).  An analogous
provision for inclusion of serial copy management technology in digital works published in
cyberspace easily could be drafted.  For a discussion of various anti-copying functions and
strategies that might be incorporated into digital copyright management systems, see BURNS,
supra note 5, at 15-21, 44-47.
19NII
 
WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 192 & n.518.  The rights management system is
conceived as a means for licensing rights in copyrighted works using electronic mail.  See Robert
E. Kahn, Deposit, Registration and Recordation in an Electronic Copyright Management System
available online <http://www.nlc-bnc.ca/documents/infopol/copyright/kahn.txt.>  Field tests of
the system began in late 1994.  Otis Port, Halting Highway Robbery on the Internet, BUSINESS
WEEK, Oct. 17, 1994, at 212.
second-generation digital copies, or from printing more than one copy.17  Similar “serial copy
management” technology is now required in all digital audio recording devices and media sold in
the United States.18
It is not yet apparent which model, if any, will become the standard for online copyright
management.  However, neither private nor public research efforts appear to contemplate built-in
technological limits on copyright owners’ monitoring capabilities.  The Library of Congress, in
conjunction with the Corporation for National Research Initiatives and the Department of
Defense, is working to develop an automated copyright registration and recordation system that
will incorporate a prototype “rights management” component.19  The publicly-available
documentation for the system does not indicate what measures, if any, have been taken to
-10-
20See NII
 
WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 192 & n.518; U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright
Office Electronic Registration, Recordation and Deposit System, available online
<http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/cords.html.>
21See Kahn, supra note 19.  For a brief overview of public key cryptography, see
Froomkin, supra note 1, at 418-419 & n.74.  For more in-depth treatments of cryptography
generally and the encryption of digital communications in particular, see BRUCE SCHNEIER,
APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY 19-56 (1994); A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: 
Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U.
 
PA. L. REV. 709, 713-14, 718-63
(1995).
22It is unlikely that the government would mandate adoption of the Copyright Office’s
system by copyright owners who prefer something different.  As in other areas of federal
technology policy, it is more likely that future legislation or regulation in this area will simply
encourage private sector development of systems and standards.  This is the approach
recommended by the government in the NII
 
WHITE PAPER.  NII WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at
233 (“Copyright owners should be free to determine what level or type of protection (if any) is
appropriate for their works, taking into consideration cost and security needs, and different
consumer and market preferences.”).
23See Weber, supra note 4, §§ 3.3, 5.5.1
24See BURNS, supra note 5, at 30-35; Weber, supra note 4.
25Burns, supra note 5, at 36; see also Reidenberg, supra note 1, at 206-07 (noting
disparity between industry and individual views on consumer privacy issues).
preserve for would-be readers an option to remain anonymous.20  Privacy is discussed only with
reference to the use of public key cryptography to keep purchase transactions secure from third
parties.21  Private industry groups also are working to develop their own copyright management
systems and standards.22  The Copyright Clearance Center, which handles photocopy licensing
for many large copyright owners, is developing a system capable of extremely fine-grained
monitoring and control.23  A number of computer technology companies are pursuing similar
capabilities, and the Association of American Publishers is following their progress closely.24 
Concern for reader privacy appears limited to the “market acceptance problems” that might
develop once systems to capture “detailed report[s] of daily usage” are in place.25  Thus, it seems
-11-
26NTIA
 
PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 14.  The report proposes the adoption of voluntary
privacy guidelines. See infra pp. 993, 1036-1037.
27Nearly all states have statutes that protect the identities and checkout records of library
patrons.  See infra note 213.  Federal laws protect the privacy of video rental and cable
consumers, but those protections may not cover online transactions.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2710; 47
U.S.C. § 551; NTIA
 
PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 14, at 16-17.  For an overview of existing
statutes that afford privacy rights to information consumers in narrower contexts, and discussion
of their flaws where anonymity is concerned, see infra Part VI.
28S. 1284 & H.R. 2441, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995).
29As of this writing, it appears that efforts to agree on a legislative markup of the original
bill have failed, and that the NIICPA will not be put to a vote this year.  See Heather Boyles,
FARNET’s Washington Update (May 17, 1996), available online
http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/farnet_on_copyr_bill_960517.article.  However, it is
overwhelmingly certain that the bill will be reintroduced when Congress reconvenes in the fall.
certain that the digital copyright management systems of the not-so-distant future will enable
copyright owners who desire it to maintain comprehensive databases of who is reading what.
The National Telecommunications and Information Administration recently released a
report that discusses in some depth the implications of digital monitoring technologies and
profiling practices for individual privacy.26  However, no statutory or regulatory barrier currently
exists that would preserve a right of anonymity for readers who purchase digital works from
private copyright owners.27  Instead, Congress is currently considering legislation of a very
different sort.
II.
  
THE PROPOSED ANTI-TAMPERING LAW
The National Information Infrastructure Copyright Protection Act (“NIICPA”),28
introduced in both houses of Congress in September 1995, represents an attempt to set “rules of
the road” for use of and access to copyrighted works in cyberspace.29  The provisions of the
NIICPA are taken verbatim from a “White Paper” issued by the Clinton Administration’s
Information Infrastructure Task Force that sets forth the Administration’s position on why
-12-
30NII
 
WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, app. 1.
31See, e.g., Jessica R. Friedman, Report, A Lawyer’s Ramble Down the Information
Superhighway:  Copyright, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 705 (1995); Jessica Litman, The Exclusive
Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29 (1994); Marybeth Peters, The Spring 1996
Horace S. Manges Lecture — The National Information Infrastructure:  A Copyright Office
Perspective, 20 COLUM-VLA J.L. & ARTS 341 (1996); Samuelson, supra note 10; Pamela
Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights and the Global Information Economy, 39 COMM. OF THE
ACM 23 (1996); Symposium, Is Congress Turning the Internet into an Information Toll Road?,
INSIGHT MAG., Jan. 15, 1996, at 24 (debate between Professor James Boyle, a leading opponent
of the NIICPA, and Rep. Carlos J. Moorhead, a sponsor of the bill).
32S. 1284 & H.R. 2441, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1995) (proposed § 1201 of the
Copyright Act).  A draft committee print prepared by the House Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on the Courts during the unsuccessful markup negotiations, see supra note 29,
would extend protection to any mechanism or system “an effect of which” is to prevent
infringement, when there is reckless disregard of facts showing that the accused device
“primarily enables such infringement.”  See Draft Committee Print of H.R. 2441 (on file with
author).
changes in the existing copyright law are necessary.30  Both the NIICPA and the NII White Paper
have been analyzed in their entirety elsewhere.31  I will focus only on section 4 of the NIICPA,
which consists of a new Chapter 12, titled “Copyright Protection and Management Systems,” to
be added to the Copyright Act.  The new chapter would establish comprehensive protection for
copyright owners’ decisions regarding copyright management in cyberspace.
The NIICPA’s protections for copyright management systems are twofold.  First, a new
section 1201 of the Copyright Act would prohibit the importation, manufacture, or distribution of
devices or services “the primary purpose or effect of which is to avoid, bypass, remove,
deactivate, or otherwise circumvent . . . any process, treatment, mechanism or system which
prevents or inhibits the violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner under
section 106” of the Copyright Act.32  Section 1202 would prohibit tampering with “copyright
-13-
33S. 1284 & H.R. 2441, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1995) (proposed § 1202 of the
Copyright Act).
34Id. § 1202(c).
35See NII
 
WHITE PAPER, note 6, at 10-12, 177-78, 230.
36See Samuelson, supra note 10, at 188 (“[I]n the future, it won’t be possible to say no,
and any effort you make to block [copyright management systems’] intrusions may make you a
felon.”).
37S. 1284 & H.R. 2441, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1995) (proposed § 1203 of the
Copyright Act).
management information” appended to a digital work by the copyright owner.33  In addition to
such straightforward items as the names of the author and copyright owner, “copyright
management information” is defined to include “terms and conditions for uses of the work.”34 
According to the NII White Paper, these provisions are needed to help copyright owners police
their copyrights, in light of the otherwise trivial ease of generating and distributing unauthorized
copies of their works throughout cyberspace.35  Their combined effect is far more sweeping, and
far less benign.  Together, they authorize copyright owners to implement the full range of
“smart” copyright management technologies described in Part I, above, and prevent readers from
taking measures to protect themselves against intrusive monitoring of their activities.36
Proposed section 1203 provides that the anti-tampering provisions of the NIICPA are to
be enforced, in the first instance, by the availability of civil damages, together with any profits
earned as a result of the prohibited acts.37  Neither the NIICPA nor the NII White Paper specifies
how the damages afforded under section 1203 are to be measured.  However, section 1203 does
not purport to supplant section 504 of the Copyright Act, which authorizes the court to award the
copyright owner “actual damages suffered . . . as a result of the infringement, and any profits of
the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing
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3817 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1994).
39S. 1284 & H.R. 2441, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1995) (proposed § 1204 of the
Copyright Act).  The draft committee print would criminalize certain violations of § 1201 as
well.  See Draft Committee Print of H.R. 2441, supra note 32.
40S. 1284 & H.R. 2441, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1995) (proposed § 1204 of the
Copyright Act).
41See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (1994); cf. United States v.
LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994) (reasoning that illegal conduct alone, without
some independent source of duty to the injured party, cannot satisfy the fraud element of the
federal wire fraud statute) (citing United States v. Dowling, 739 F.2d 1445, 1449-50 (9th Cir.
1984), rev’d in part on other grounds, 473 U.S. 207 (1985)).
the actual damages.”38  This suggests that section 1203 should be interpreted as authorizing only
those damages and profits attributable to the act of tampering, as distinct from damages
attributable to the act of infringement, which will remain available under section 504.  It is
difficult to imagine how such additional damages might be quantified, which in turn suggests
that section 1203, properly understood, is punitive rather than remedial in nature.
In addition to civil penalties, the NIICPA also authorizes criminal penalties for certain
violations of section 1202, the provision that protects “copyright management information”
against tampering.39  Conviction under section 1204 will require a showing of “intent to
defraud.”40  However, section 1204 does not state what the violator must have intended to
defraud the copyright owner of.  Here again, more than mere infringement seems indicated. 
Interpreting section 1204 to require only intent to defraud the copyright owner of the right to
charge rents for the infringing use would render meaningless existing statutory provisions that
already authorize criminal penalties for willful infringement.41
These new statutory provisions regarding copyright management systems appear intended
to give copyright owners carte blanche to adopt whatever copyright management technologies
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WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 233 (“Copyright owners should be free to
determine what level or type of protection (if any) is appropriate for their works.”).
43Id. at 191.
44U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, National Telecommunications & Information Administration,
The National Information Infrastructure:  Agenda For Action, 58 FED. REG. 49,025, at 49,035
(1993).
45U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Information Infrastructure Task force, Privacy Working
Group, Privacy and the National Information Infrastructure:  Principles for Providing and Using
Personal Information (1995) [hereinafter NII
 
PRIVACY REPORT], available online
<gopher://ntiantl.ntia.doc.gov:70/n0/papers/documents/files/niiprivprin final.html>.
they conclude will best serve their interests.42  The NII White Paper gives only the barest of nods
to the possible consequences for reader privacy and anonymity.  It notes that copyright
management systems “must be carefully designed and implemented to ensure that they . . . do not
unduly burden use of the work by consumers or compromise their privacy.”43  Apart from this
vague and fleeting show of concern, however, the NII White Paper expresses no opinion as to the
types of copyright management practices that would be unduly burdensome or intrusive, and
takes no position on the safeguards for reader privacy that a satisfactory system should contain. 
Nor does it suggest that the government should require adoption of such safeguards.  The
language of the NIICPA itself contains no mention of these concerns.
The Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, which drafted the NII White Paper,
was only one arm of the Information Infrastructure Task Force.  The Task Force also convened a
Working Group on Privacy to address questions relating to the protection of individual privacy in
cyberspace.44  The results of that effort provide little comfort, however.  While the Working
Group on Intellectual Property Rights came up with a detailed legislative proposal, the Working
Group on Privacy compiled only a list of “principles” for both government and private industry
to use in structuring future privacy policies.45  These principles “do not have the force of law and
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46Id. at Introduction.  In contrast, the European Union has adopted a directive requiring all
member countries to enact laws that govern the collection, maintenance, use, and disclosure of
personal data, and has designated threshold standards that such laws must meet.  See Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protesbon of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31; Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polis:  The EU Directive on
the Protection of Personal Data, 80 IOWA L. REV. 445 (1995).  The European Union’s Green
Paper dealing with intellectual property and the global information infrastructure (the counterpart
to the NII White Paper) is correspondingly more sensitive to the privacy and anonymity
implications of digital copyright management systems.  Commission of the European
Communities, Green Paper:  Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society 
COM(95)382, 79-80 (1995) (calling for “a detailed examination” of the privacy implications of
copyright management technologies); see also Samuelson, supra note 10, at 25.
47NII
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PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 14.
50NTIA
 
PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 14, at 19-27.  For a more detailed description of the
NTIA proposal, see infra p. 1036-1037.
do not create any substantive or procedural right enforceable at law.”46  In addition, although the
NII Privacy Report expressly recognizes that “individuals should have the opportunity to remain
anonymous, when appropriate,”47 the examples it provides suggest a definition of “appropriate”
that is narrow and highly deferential to the perceived needs of private copyright owners. 
“[B]rows[ing] a public electronic library” would be included48; by implication, browsing
materials held out for purchase by a private content provider would not be considered an
“appropriate” occasion for readers to assert, or take measures to protect, their anonymity rights.
A subsequent report issued by the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (“NTIA”) expands upon this voluntary approach to the protection of individual
privacy rights in cyberspace.49  The NTIA Privacy Report recommends that holders of personal
information adopt privacy policies based on principles of informed consent.50  The report makes
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PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 14 at 20-21; see Irving, supra note 12, at 260
(“[T]he plan’s success depends on service providers’ willingness to be self-regulating.”).  The
report suggests that the government should mandate privacy standards only “[i]f such private
sector action is not forthcoming.”  NTIA
 
PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 14, at 21.
52See, e.g., David D. Friedman, Why Encryption Matters, available online
<http://www.best.com/~ddfr/ Libertarian/Why_Crypto_Matters.html>; Timothy C. May, Crypto
Anarchy and Virtual Communities, available online
<http://www.c2.org/~arkuat/consent/Anarchy.html>; Timothy C. May, Cyphernomicon 2.13,
available online <http://ocaxpl.cc.oberlin.edu/~brchkind/cyphernomicon/chapter2/2.13.html>;
DigitaLiberty FAQ, available online <http://www.digitalib.org/dl-faq.html>.
clear that its proposed notice-and-consent guidelines should be hortatory rather than mandatory.51 
Neither the Working Group’s “principles” nor the NTIA’s proposed guidelines provide much of
a counterweight to the NIICPA’s express scheme for the protection of copyright management
systems, which would allow intrusions upon reader privacy and anonymity by technological fiat.
If information consumers are to be afforded meaningful protection against loss of their
anonymity to intrusive copyright management practices, that protection must be found elsewhere. 
Before turning to that question, however, I consider whether the NIICPA and the copyright
management regime it is designed to protect should be viewed as the products of an emerging
societal consensus or bargain regarding the appropriate default rules for access to digital works.
III.
  
COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT, PRIVATE ORDERING,
AND SOCIAL CONTROL
Many commentators have hailed cyberspace as a relatively costless medium of interaction
that will permit experimentation with decentralized, contract-based forms of social ordering. 
Some espouse the libertarian view that individuals should be free to contract, or refuse to
contract, with whomever they choose and about whatever they choose without government
interference.52  Others, including many academic commentators, view such “private ordering” as
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53See, e.g., Robert L. Dunne, Deterring Unauthorized Access to Computers:  Controlling
Behavior in Cyberspace Through A Contract Law Paradigm, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 1 (1994); I.
Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace”, 55 U.
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Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Electronic Network Communities, 38 VILL. L. REV.
349 (1993).
54See David Kline & Daniel Burstein, Is Government Obsolete?, WIRED 4.01, Jan. 1996,
at 86 (outlining this argument and identifying some of its proponents).
55NII
 
WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 58-59, 192 n.517 (characterizing “rights
management” systems simply as a form of electronic contracting).
56See, e.g., Hardy, supra note 53, at 1022-24, 1036-41.
presumptively more efficient in many cases.53  Still others favor private ordering as the antidote
to “big government.”54  The NII White Paper appears to reflect a combination of these views.  As
described there, digital copyright management systems are a desirable and presumptively
legitimate form of private ordering.55
Private ordering is not an unequivocal good, however, but a choice that may be
acceptable or not, depending on the context.  Whatever the abstract force of arguments that the
law should not intervene in a functioning system of social control based on private agreements,
those arguments merit little weight in the debate over how much discretion to allow copyright
owners in the realm of online rights management.  Among readers and copyright owners, the
threads of “community” are too tenuous and the power imbalances too stark to support the
conclusion that the nascent digital copyright management regime is a legitimate, bargained-for
result.
Advocates of private ordering have identified several different models, any of which
might plausibly provide a pattern for rulemaking in cyberspace.  First, the forces of custom and
community might combine to produce a system of consensual norms for governing access to
copyrighted works.56  Second, one might envision a less consensual but equally informal regime
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58Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law:  How Neighbors Settle Disputes 177-206
(1991); see also Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 311, 314
(1995).
59Ellickson, supra note 58, at 41-81, 185-89.
of virtual copyright management based on the freedom of individual authors and copyright
owners to set terms for access to their works and the freedom of individual readers to reject those
terms and purchase reading material elsewhere.57  Finally, one might seek to understand the
proposed digital copyright management regime, including the anti-tampering provisions of the
NIICPA, as the result of bargaining at the interest group level.  None of these models explains,
much less justifies, the institution of anonymity-destroying digital copyright management
systems.  I address each in turn.
A leading recent study of informal private ordering suggests that, in general, systems of
consensual extra-legal norms are likely to emerge among fairly well-defined, close-knit
communities of repeat players.58  In his study of dispute resolution among Shasta County,
California cattle ranchers and their neighbors, Professor Ellickson found that the small, relatively
self-contained community had developed its own set of internal rules for responding to property
damage caused by trespassing livestock and for ensuring the construction and repair of boundary
fences.59  The parties affected by the impending digital copyright management regime exhibit
none of the characteristics that Ellickson identifies as important for the development of such
norms.
First, the “community” of authors, owners, and readers of copyrighted works is neither
well-defined nor close-knit.  It encompasses, on the one hand, giant publishing and entertainment
-20-
60See Ellickson, supra note 58, at 65-81, 188-89 (describing noms that govern fence
construction and repair); cf. Perritt, supra note 53, at 360 (observing that the “multidimensional
relationships” necessary for the development of a functioning system of extra-legal norms
typically do not exist on electronic networks).
61See, e.g., BURNS, supra note 5, at 59-62 (recommending that the Association of
American Publishers “lead the evolution” of the digital copyright management regime);
ELLICKSON, supra note 58, at 169 (acknowledging that some closely knit groups may have noms
that maximize their own welfare at the expense of other groups); Lewis A. Komhauser, Are
There Cracks in the Foundation of Spontaneous Order?, 67 N.Y.U.
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REV. 647, 652-55 (1992)
(noting the potential problem of “exploitation of some external group,” and further noting that
unequal distribution of power within groups also may preclude formation of consensual, informal
noms of the type Ellickson describes).
62Ellickson, supra note 58, at 82-103.
conglomerates such as Time-Warner and, on the other, anyone who has ever read a newspaper
article or watched a movie.  While all members of the copyright “community” depend on one
another, in some sense, for the production, distribution, and consumption of creative works, the
community’s sheer size and diversity of tastes ensures that members do not depend on each other
with the same immediacy as two Shasta County neighbors who share a boundary fence.60
A second, and related, objection is that to the extent digital copyright management
systems can be said to reflect shared extra-legal norms developed by repeat-player members of a
copyright “community,” that community does not include readers.61  The transient nature of the
reader’s interest in particular copyrighted works, compared with the more enduring interests of
the authors and copyright owners in administering the rights to all of their works, marks the
reader as the outsider.  Ellickson offers a highway collision involving a passing tourist as an
example of a situation in which Shasta County locals are content to leave adjudication of fault
and determination of remedy to the legal superstructure.62  The passing tourist has no authority to
invoke the system of third-party enforcement that has arisen among neighbors who are repeat
players in interactions with each other.  Similarly, it is extremely unlikely that the individual
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TIMES, Apr. 19, 1994, at Dl.  But see Perritt, supra note 53, at
360 (suggesting that the efficacy of third-party enforcement will diminish as the online
population grows).
65See Perritt, supra note 53, at 360; cf. Lemley, supra note 58, at 314 (“Unlike e-mail
discussions, or the posting of free information, commerce requires either a legal enforcement
mechanism or a high degree of trust among market participants.”).
reader who wishes anonymous access to a copyrighted work will be able to pressure the owner to
grant it by invoking shared norms that the reader helped create.
This is not to say that Ellickson’s model can never be valid in cyberspace.  Geographic
proximity need not be the touchstone for community.  Thus, for example, the model of
consensual private ordering based on shared extra-legal norms may have some validity in the
case of a small, inherently self-contained online discussion group.  This is so because the notion
of consent plays a critical role in the process of community self-definition.  As a result, all
members of the community will assist in enforcing the extra-legal norms that have developed
within the community.63  Members of online discussion groups have a shared interest in keeping
the discussion within certain broadly defined parameters of relevance, and in making sure that
fellow list members adhere to certain standards, however minimal, of courteous online behavior. 
Even those members who occasionally transgress group norms will assist in enforcing those rules
of “netiquette” against others.64
It is this sense of common interest and perceived interdependence that the group
composed of readers, authors, and owners of copyrighted works lacks.65  Compelling evidence of
this lack of community is the urgency with which copyright owners have supported passage of
the anti-tampering provisions of the NIICPA — contrasted with the behavior of Shasta County
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66See Ellickson, supra note 58, at 48-64, 69-81.  For testimony and statements in support
of the NIICPA’s anti-tampering provisions, see National Information Infrastructure:  Hearings
on S. 1284 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 7, 1996)
(statement of Kenneth R. Kay, Executive Director, Creative Incentive Coalition), available in
WESTLAW, USTestimony database; Copyright Protection on the Internet:  Hearings on H.R
2441 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 7, 1996) (statements of the Association of American
Publishers; Barbara A. Munder, Senior Vice President, The McGraw-Hill Companies; Frances
W. Preston, President and CEO, Broadcast Music, Inc.; Jack Valenti, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.), available in WESTLAW,
USTestimony database; Creative Incentive Coalition, Ten Myths About the NII Copyright
Protection Act (1996), available online <http://www.cic.org/myths.html>; see also On-Line
Security Issues:  Hearings on S /726 Before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology and Space of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 12, 1996) (statement of Jack
Valenti Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.),
available in WESTLAW, USTestimony database.
It is also worth noting that the NIICPA’s anti-tampering provisions have been opposed by
a coalition of organizations representing, inter alia, educators and libraries; presumably, this
would not be the case if the provisions merely restated a consensus.  See National Information
Infrastructure:  Hearings on S. 1284 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d
Sess. (May 7, 1996) (statement of Prof. Robert Oakley, Georgetown University Law Center, for
the Digital Future Coalition), available in WESTLAW, USTestimony database; Digital Future
Coalition, Statement of Members of the Digital Future Coalition on H.R. 2441:  The NII
Copyright Protection Act of 1995 (Feb. 15, 1996), available online
<http://www.ari.net/dfc/info/Copyright.html>.  I should note that I belong to the Committee of
Concerned Intellectual Property Educators, a member organization of the Digital Future
Coalition.
67See Litman, supra note 31, at 31-32, 39 42; cf. Edward L. Rubin, The Nonjudicial Life
of Contract:  Beyond the Shadow of the Law, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 107, 125-31 (arguing that self-
help is an important element of private ordering via contract and that repeat players enjoy
“simply overwhelming” advantages in implementing the self-help strategies of their choice); see
also Edward L. Rubin, The Nonjudicial Life of Contract:  Beyond the Shadow of the Law, 90
NW. U. L. REV. 107, 125-31 (arguing that self-help is an important element of private ordering
via contract and that repeat players enjoy “simply overwhelming” advantages in implementing
residents, who simply resolved their own disputes without recourse to the legal system and often
without knowledge or apparent concern as to what the law actually said.66  The monitoring and
metering capabilities now being incorporated into prototype digital copyright management
systems are not community responses to isolated incidents of misbehavior by transgressors, but
the unilateral, self-help response of copyright owners to the ordinary behavior of readers.67
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the self-help strategies of their choice).
68There is every reason to believe that copyright owners will do so.  See BURNS, supra
note 5, at 59-62 (recommending that the Association of American Publishers “move as swifty as
possible toward” the development of a standard for attaching usage restrictions to digital works
and that it “lead the evolution” of digital copyright management technologies); Weber, supra
note 4 (describing Copyright Clearance Center’s plan to offer comprehensive digital copyright
management services to member publishers); see also On-Line Security Issues:  Hearings on S.
1726 Before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology and Space of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 12, 1996) (statement of Jack Valenti, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.), available online
WESTLAW, USTestimony database.
69See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1283-86.  Professor Perritt acknowledges that contract
theories based on presumed equality of bargaining power may be “artificial,” and that in such
situations societal norms of fairness should play a role in determining the acceptability of
particular terms.  Perritt, supra note 53, at 369-71.
The second model of private ordering, which focuses on the cumulative effect of many
arms-length transactions, would suggest that individual readers might nonetheless exert pressure
on copyright owners who demand identifying information — either by bargaining for more
acceptable terms or by taking their business elsewhere.  If enough readers are unwilling to
purchase a particular copyrighted work on the terms offered, market forces will lead the
copyright owner to rethink its position.  Contracts fare no better than norms in this regard,
however.  If copyright owners as a class adopt digital copyright management systems designed to
capture readers’ identities and monitor individual reading activities, it is unlikely that disgruntled
readers will have any significant impact on that practice.68
Neither abstract notions of freedom of contract nor theories about efficient markets justify
slavish adherence to contractarianism in all cases involving intellectual property rights.69  Reader
anonymity is the paradigmatic example of an issue that a contract model is ill-suited to resolve. 
From a purely economic standpoint, market pressures will reach high enough levels to affect
particular copyright management choices only if enough individual readers conclude that the
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70See Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance:  Public Choice and the First
Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 560-61 (1991).
71See id. at 558-59 (discussing attributes of public goods).  Requiring eligible individuals
to identify themselves to demonstrate entitlement to anonymity would defeat the purpose.
benefits of withholding their custom outweigh the costs.  In the particular case of a demand for
reader identifying information, there is no reason to assume this is likely, and much reason to
suspect the opposite.  Professor Farber has argued that speech has public good characteristics that
may require special protection precisely because information consumers do not accurately value
the benefits of incremental speech.70  The identical analysis applies to anonymous reading.  It is
difficult, if not impossible, to grant the benefits of anonymity to some individuals and withhold
them from others.71  It is also difficult to value anonymity in the abstract.  Most likely, readers
who seek access to “ordinary,” mainstream materials for “ordinary,” non-embarrassing reasons
— that is, most readers in most instances — will conclude that holding out for anonymous access
is not worth it.  Moreover, the perceived costs of forgoing access to desired reading material will
rise, and the likelihood of reader hold-out will fall, as more reading material is technologically
protected.  In other words, the more pervasive digital copyright management systems become, the
less likely readers will be to refuse to contract with them.  It is worth noting, moreover, that the
anti-tampering provisions of the NIICPA, if enacted, can only decrease readers’ aggregate
leverage over copyright management decisions by foreclosing resistance through self-help.
If the argument that individual readers can influence copyright management decisions by
withholding their business is implausible, the argument that they may seek such changes by
bargaining with copyright owners one-on-one is, quite simply, absurd.  First, the whole point of a
digital copyright management regime is to eliminate the per-transaction bargaining that copyright
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72Although some commentators have argued that the rise of electronic distribution
systems will allow authors to eliminate large publishing intermediaries and transact business with
readers on an individual basis.  See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do,
104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1834-1836 (1995); see also Barlow, supra note 5, at 126-28, the rise of
digital copyright management technologies suggests precisely the opposite trend.  On the
information superhighway of the very near future, publishers who formerly controlled the
physical plant necessary to distribute a work will administer the copyright management software
that performs the equivalent function, and the bargaining position of individual readers will be, if
anything, worse than before.  Professor Perritt acknowledges that contract theories based on
presumed equality of bargaining power may be “artificial,” and that in such situations societal
norms of fairness should play a role in determining the acceptability of particular terms.  Perritt,
supra note 53, at 369-71.
73Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958) (“To require that
[the First Amendment right to nondisclosure of group membership] be claimed by the members
themselves would result in nullification of the right at the very moment of its assertion.”).
74See, e.g., Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 35-44 (1991) (defining interest group theory as based on the
presumption that interest groups act to further their own welfare at the expense of other groups);
cf. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV.
873, 900-01, 906-07 (1987) (arguing that a pure interest group theory does not adequately
describe the legislative process, but that interest groups do “play a significant role” in that
process).
owners find so cumbersome to administer.72  The only way to “bargain” with a digital rights
management system is by hacking around it — the precise conduct that the NIICPA will prohibit. 
Second, and self-evidently, a right to read anonymously cannot be preserved if it must first be
bargained for on a case by case basis.  The act of bargaining negates the goal of concealment.73
Individual anonymity can be preserved, if at all, only by effective representation of
readers as a group, through arms-length bargaining with the group of copyright owners — the
third model of private ordering in cyberspace — or through the quasi-private, indirect bargaining
characteristic of “public choice.”74  There are significant economic obstacles to collective action
by readers, however.  For the same reasons that most readers will simply acquiesce to the loss of
anonymity on most occasions, many individuals will decide that the costs of organization
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75See Farber, supra note 70, at 560-61 (discussing MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION:  PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 163-64 (1971)).  Olson
demonstrated that larger groups are disadvantaged in the bargaining arena because their
members, each perceiving a low benefit from organization relative to its costs, will tend to free
fide on the efforts of other group members, thereby reducing the group’s overall strength.  For a
straightforward illustration of this process, see David McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust
Immunity:  State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 293, 324-25 (1994).
76See, e.g., Sandy Close & Nick Montfort, Free-Speech Activists in Cyberspace Gird for
Virtual War, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 13, 1996, at 15A (describing Internet protests against the
Communications Decency Act); Jeffrey Weiss, ‘24 Hours of Democracy’ Puts Free Speech
Protesters On Line, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 23, 1996, at 7A (same); Academics Stir
Internet Protest as Cambridge Press Shuns Book, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 17, 1996, at
A17 (describing protest by academic authors of publisher’s decision not to publish controversial
book); Associated Press, Internet Now Home of Attack on Big Mac:  McDonald’s Protesters,
Spurred By A 2-Year-Old Libel Trial, Have Set Up A Site on the Internet, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Mar. 26, 1996, at B5 (describing use of Internet site to coordinate protest against McDonald’s).
77The NIICPA itself may become a test of whether such an effort by a relatively diffuse
coalition of groups and individuals can succeed.  See Digital Future Coalition, Statement of
Members of the Digital Future Coalition on H.R. 2441:  The NII Copyright Protection Act of
1995 (Feb. 15, 1996), available online <http://www.ari.net/dfc/info/Copyright.htm1>, supra note
66.
outweigh the benefits.75  It is true that some costs of collective action, particularly those
associated with intra-group communication, are medium-specific.  Thus, it is conceivable that in
time, the ease and affordability of real-time communication in cyberspace might eliminate some
of the more obvious transaction costs that might foreclose collective action by readers in the
“real” world.  In other contexts, the Internet has proved an unprecedentedly effective medium for
harnessing collective protests by “netizens” against both government and private actions.76 
However, effective lobbying for legal change requires a far more sustained investment of effort
and resources, and some real-world infrastructure to coordinate that effort.77
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79See supra pp. 990-92.
80See supra note 66 and accompanying text.  This strong support for the proposed anti-
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A theory of collective action also must consider whether one interest group might
effectively “capture,” or simply preempt, the bargaining process.78  The institution of digital
copyright management systems — an action entirely within the discretion of copyright owners to
undertake or forgo — affords an excellent example of preemption.  Such unilateral action renders
wholly irrelevant the interest group priorities that the group of readers might assert in a
hypothetical private bargaining process.  The anti-tampering provisions of the NIICPA, in
contrast, raise suspicions of legislative capture.  Those provisions, described above, would vest
copyright owners with absolute authority to define the scope of the digital rights management
regime, and would make any interference with their choices illegal.79  It is difficult to imagine a
more blatant example of single-interest group legislation.  Not surprisingly, publishers of
copyrighted works have given the proposed law their enthusiastic support.80
The problem with all three models of private ordering, in short, is that the process of
rule-formation may not reflect the participation of all the groups whose interests should be
considered.81  In particular, when some market participants are comparatively well-heeled and
well-organized repeat players and others are not, the resulting rule — whether characterized as
norm or arms-length bargain, and whether legal or extra-legal — will simply reflect the balance
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Lloyd L. Weinreb, Custom, Law, and Pubic Policy:  The INS Case as an Example for Intellectual
Property, 78 VA. L. REV. 141, 144 (1992) (arguing that theories of “spontaneous social order”
merely “confirm[ ] and celebrate[ ] power”).
83Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial Exchange:  A
Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1611-13 (1995).
84Id. at 1611 (quoting Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion — Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943)).
85See Lemley, supra note 58, at 319-21.  Thus, Professor Lemley observes, “this new law
of the Internet would be unlike any form of legislation known to modem society.  No one elected
its drafters . . . . They are accountable to no one.  There is no provision for varying the model
code in individual cases, or for amending the code itself at popular request.  Nor is there any
provision for ‘opting out’ of this new social contract, other than by withdrawing from
cyberspace.”  Id. at 321.  If, as I have predicted is likely, digital copyright management systems
become universal and are judged a valid, consent-based form of contracting, and if federal
copyright law does not preempt inconsistent license terms, see supra note 3, the substantive
limits that copyright law places on owners’ rights may become irrelevant for all practical
purposes.
of power.82  Professor Merges has suggested that interest-group priorities unilaterally imposed via
standardized contracts may achieve such a high degree of market penetration as to amount to
private legislation imposed on other, unrepresented interest groups.83  He argues that in such
cases, the contracts “‘become effective instruments in the hands of powerful industrial and
commercial overlords, enabling them to impose a new feudal order of their own making.’”84 
This analysis applies equally to the unilateral institution of copyright management systems —
which, after all, are simply standardized adhesion contracts in digital form.85
In sum, “private ordering” is not a talisman, but simply a descriptor for a variety of
activities that occur, to some degree, within any legal regime.  When the terms and conditions of
access to copyrighted works are at issue, the paradigmatic small, close-knit community of repeat
players necessary for a legitimate — i.e., consensual and self-enforcing — system of “order
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86See Weinreb, supra note 82, at 143; see also Merges, supra note 83, at 1611-13 (arguing
that ostensibly private but universally-adopted contract provisions may have the effect of
subverting federal copyright policy and substituting private, undemocratically determined
conceptions of good policy in its place).
87Notable exceptions are Ulrika Ekman Ault, The FBI’s Library Awareness Program:  Is
Big Brother Reading Over Your Shoulder?, 65 N.Y.U.
 
L.
 
REV. 1532, 1540-46 (1990); William E.
Lee, The Supreme Court and the Right to Receive Expression, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 303; and
Robert M. O’Neil, Libraries, Liberties and the First Amendment, 42 U.
 
CIN. L. REV. 209 (1973).
without law” simply does not exist.  And to the extent readers lack the ability to bargain
effectively, either individually or collectively, and copyright owners possess the ability
unilaterally to impose technological gateways that maximize their control over the conditions of
access to copyrighted works, the resulting regime can hardly be characterized as the result of
“market pressures,” “interest-group bargaining,” or “public choice.”  In the electronic copyright
management regime now under construction, consumers of digital works will lose the ability to
read anonymously whether they like it or not.  That copyright management systems may
nonetheless represent “private ordering” of a sort does not resolve — or even begin to answer —
the question whether that result represents good policy or good law.86  The remainder of this
Article addresses that question.
IV.
  
A
 
RIGHT TO READ ANONYMOUSLY
For the most part, First Amendment jurisprudence has defined readers’ rights only
incidentally.  Historically, both courts and commentators have been more concerned with
protecting speakers than with protecting readers.  Protection of speech is, of course, the First
Amendment’s central, express guarantee.  Until recently, however, the technological means to
monitor individuals’ reading habits did not exist.  Thus, the questions whether the First
Amendment should be read to establish a right to read and what scope to accord such a right have
demanded, and received, comparatively little attention.87  They merit a great deal of attention
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For a preliminary discussion of reader anonymity in the context of digital payment systems
generally, see Froomkin, supra note 1, at 496-503.  Professor Lee’s 1987 review of Supreme
Court decisions demonstrated that the “right to receive” had been addressed solely on a
piecemeal, ad hoc basis, and that the Court had yet to articulate a cohesive vision of the right.
Nor has it done so in more recent years.
88The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that the First Amendment encompasses a
right to receive information from a willing speaker.  See infra note 137 and accompanying text. 
My purpose here is to examine the scope of that right.  The questions whether and when there
might exist an affirmative right of access to particular reading materials are subjects for another
Article.
89Of course, a constitutional right to read anonymously will not afford protection against
the actions of private copyright owners unless those actions somehow implicate state action.  Part
V, infra, addresses the state action problem.
90As is appropriate in an article about reading, my working definition of the nature and
scope of communication is derived in part from copyright law — the body of law that grants and
protects authorship rights in written speech.  See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine
now.  In light of the new digital monitoring technologies, it is vitally important that we
reexamine our understanding of reading, its relationship to speech, and its place in our
jurisprudence of speech and speaker’s rights.  This Article begins one part of that project, by
considering whether there is or should be a right of anonymous access to reading materials that
are otherwise made available by willing distributors.88  It concludes that the close
interdependence between receipt and expression of information and between reading and
freedom of thought make recognition of such a right sound constitutional policy.89
The question whether the First Amendment protects a right to read anonymously is, in
essence, the question whether the textual reference to “speech” may or should be understood to
encompass and shield from interference all of the modes by which we participate in the process
of communication.  Communication may be oral or written, and participation in a given act of
communication may be active or passive.90  It is a truism that both “active” modes of
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of free expression.”).  A copyrightable work of authorship may consist of words, images, or
sounds, but also may consist of “numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia.”  See
17 U.S.C. § 101.  Thus, numerical or symbolic works, like verbal works, may constitute
constitutional “speech.”  Berstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1434-36 (N.D. Cal.
1996).  However, to be copyrightable, a work must be “fixed” in some tangible medium from
which it is capable of being “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.”  17 U.S.C.
§ 101.  Thus, my working definition is narrow as well as broad, in that it does not take into
account the debate over the communicative significance of unfixed, nonverbal acts.  Thus, for
example, it is not my intent to define as “reading” the experience of witnessing an act of
flag-burning.  Arguably, some of the conduct one witnesses may be as constitutive of individual
thoughts, beliefs, and subsequent expression as anything one reads.  See infra pp. 1007-08. 
Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine a limiting principle, and wholly implausible to contend that
First Amendment protection extends to everything one does and sees.  In my view, it is neither
inconsistent nor undesirable to single out the receipt of core First Amendment communication —
listening and reading (including the viewing of fixed images) — as worthy of special protection.
91See supra notes 87, 88.  The debate over the extent of constitutional protection for
scientific research also touches on this issue.  See, e.g., Richard Delgado & David R. Millen,
God, Galileo, and Government:  Toward Constitutional Protection for Scientific Inquiry, 53
WASH. L. REV. 349 (1978); Gary L. Francione, Experimentation and the Marketplace Theory of
the First Amendment, 136 U.
 
PA. L. REV. 417 (1987); John A. Robertson, The Scientist’s Right to
Research:  A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S.
 
CAL. L. REV. 1203 (1977).  Both Professor Robertson
and the team of Professor Delgado and Mr. Millen argue that scientific research should be
privileged as a necessary precondition for the dissemination of scientific information.  Both sets
of authors rely in part on a First Amendment right to receive information, although their
arguments take slightly different paths.  Robertson contends that a scientist’s right to receive the
information necessary to conduct research derives from the public’s right to receive information
about the end-result of such research, and suggests that scientific information is particularly
important for the public to receive.  Robertson, supra, at 1216-25.  Delgado and Millen argue
that a scientist’s right to receive information mirrors the more general right of all citizens to
receive information on issues of public concern.  Delgado & Millen, supra, at 382-85.
Pointing out the contingent and culturally determined nature of efforts to identify the
activities that are properly considered “scientific” or “informative,” Professor Francione
persuasively rebuts efforts to single out scientific research for special treatment.  Francione,
supra, at 482-510.  He concludes, however, that the First Amendment cannot be understood to
protect any preconditions for speech without thereby protecting all of human conduct.  Id. at 448,
501.  As discussed in note 90, supra, I believe that reading can be privileged without such a risk. 
Unlike Delgado and Millen, however, I believe that the relationship between reading and speech
is fundamental and structural; receipt of external information is an essential precondition not just
for “informed” speech, but for any speech.  See infra pp. 1007-1008.
communication — speaking and writing — qualify as constitutional “speech.”  The relationship
between the receipt of information and expression is less well-explored.91
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92See M.T.
 
CLANCHY, FROM MEMORY TO WRITTEN RECORD:  ENGLAND 1066-1307 at
266-93 (2d ed. 1993).
93See id. at 266-93.  Only gradually did solitary, silent reading become the predominant
method of using written texts.
94For a concise, readable introduction to the concepts of hypertext and “hypermedia,” see
JAY DAVID BOLTER, WRITING SPACE:  THE COMPUTER, HYPERTEXT, AND THE HISTORY OF
WRITING 21-31 (1991); see also M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD 198-211 (1995).
95See BOLTER, supra note 94, at 59-61, 113-19; GEORGE P. LANDOW, HYPERTEXT:  THE
CONVERGENCE OF CONTEMPORARY CRITICAL THEORY AND TECHNOLOGY 14-17 (1992)
(development of hypertext “reconceive[d] reading as an active process that involves writing”), id.
at 88-92; see also Paul Roberts, Virtual Grub Street:  Sorrows of a Multimedia Hack, 292
HARPER’S MAGAZINE 71, 75-77 (1996) (“The nexus of creativity is shifted from the writer to
either the producers, who lay out the text links, or the readers, who make use of those links.”); cf.
American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 992 F. Supp. 824, 843-44 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“Once one
has entered cyberspace, one may engage in the dialogue that occurs there.  In the argot of the
medium, the receiver can and does become the content provider, and vice-versa.”).
As a matter of both historical and current practice, the distinction between “active”
expression and “passive” receipt is less clear than one might suppose.  From a historical
perspective, the strict demarcation between speaking and reading is a relatively recent one.  For
much of human history, everything from stories to important business matters was transmitted
orally.92  Even after the advent of written manuscripts, the words they contained were first “read”
by speaking them aloud.93  We have come a long way from the days of medieval scribes and
public readings of texts and missives.  However, with the advent of electronic networks and
hypertext links, expression and receipt of information are blurring once again.94  Electronic text
is dynamic; rather than following a single, linear progression, the reader is free to choose his or
her own path through a network of linked material.  Through this process, the reader participates
in the construction of the author’s message.95  While it may be premature to speak of the demise
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96Compare BOLTER, supra note 94, at 153-66 (suggesting that the electronic author loses
direct control over the path of the text but gains the power to “manipulate the reader’s time at one
remove” by careful construction of textual cross-references), with Roberts, supra note 95, at
75-77 (predicting that the author will vanish in the electronic age).
97See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1169 (1994) (“Every
book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which
was well known and used before.”) (quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (D. Mass.
1845) (Story, J.)); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966 (1990); Robert
H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor:  Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of the Work, 68
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725, 756-57 (1993); see also JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND
SPLEENS:  LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 54-57 (1996) (arguing
that the concept of the “romantic author” is a cultural construct that conveniently obscures the
extent to which so-called “original” works of authorship are based on shared, preexisting cultural
referents); Peter Jaszi, Toward A Theory of Copyright:  The Metamorphoses of ‘Authorship,’ 41
DUKE L.J. 455 (1991) (tracing the evolution of the “Romantic vision of ‘authorship”’ throughout
the history of American copyright law).
of the author,96 the creation of at least some “speech” in cyberspace thus reflects the combined
efforts of both “authors” and “readers.”
The uncertain separation between speaking and reading in the digital medium is simply
an external manifestation of a process that all readers and listeners undergo.  Functionally, the
activities of the recipient and the proponent of speech — reading/hearing and speaking/writing,
respectively — are properly viewed as two halves of the same whole.  Freedom of speech is an
empty guarantee unless one has something — anything — to say.  A central insight that both
copyright and literary theory can lend to First Amendment jurisprudence is that the content of
one’s speech is shaped by one’s response to all prior speech, both oral and written, to which one
has been exposed.
The principle that individual expression is necessarily cumulative has a rich lineage in
both copyright law and critical copyright theory.  “Originality,” as a prerequisite for copyright
protection, is a term of art; it is well-understood that every “original” work of authorship is, in
many respects, a distillation of the works that came before it.97  The same is true of any
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98See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (copyright subsists in “original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression”).
99See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information
Superhighway:  The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 346, 400 n.284 (1995) (“[T]he objective world receives its meaning through
symbolic communication, and is, therefore, necessarily mediated by dialogic relations.  Identities
and ideologies are formed through dialogical interaction with shared cultural symbols.” (citing
MICHAEL GARDINER, THE DIALOGICS OF CRITIQUE:  M.M. BAKHTIN AND THE THEORY OF
IDEOLOGY (1992))); cf. BOLTER, supra note 94, at 156-57 (characterizing text as “‘ . . . an arena
in which reader and author participate in a game of the imagination’ . . . every text leaves gaps
for the reader to complete” (quoting Wolfgang Iser, The Reading Process:  A Phenomenological
Approach, in JANE P. TOMPKINS, READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM:  FROM FORMALISM TO
POST-STRUCTURALISM 50-69 (1974))); Rotstein, supra note 97, at 736-37 (describing the
emergence of the post-structuralist view of text as dependent upon reader interpretation).
100Cf. Elkin-Koren, supra note 99, at 400 (characterizing cultural and political discourse
as “an ongoing process of meaning-making through communicative activities” that include both
communication and interpretation of preexisting symbols or cultural signifiers).  Various
members of the Supreme Court appears to have recognized a weaker version of this argument.  In
Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), three
justices characterized “the right to receive ideas” as “a necessary predicate to the recipient’s
meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom.”  Id. at 867
(plurality) (emphasis in original); see also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 775 (1972)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the freedoms to hear and to speak “are inseparable; they
are two sides of the same coin”); Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1967)
(observing that members of the public have the right “to receive suitable access to social,
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences”).  That is so, however, not merely
because of the useful or relevant information that is conveyed, see Pico, 457 U.S. at 867-68
(plurality), but because without access to the universe of preexisting speech that defines our
understanding of the world and our place in it, one would literally have nothing to say.
expression of an idea, whether or not “fixed” enough to qualify for copyright protection.98 
Thoughts and opinions, which are the predicates to speech, cannot arise in a vacuum.  Whatever
their content, they are responses formed to things heard or read.99  It is this iterative process of
“speech-formation” — which determines, ultimately, both the content of one’s speech and the
particular viewpoint one espouses — that the First Amendment should shield from scrutiny.100
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101The debate over scientific research falls into this error.  See supra note 91.
102See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1519 (1995); Mills
v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70
(1964).
103354 U.S. 234 (1957) (plurality).
To object that comparatively few people conduct in-depth research before sharing their
views on a particular topic is to miss the point.101  All speech responds to prior speech of some
sort.  The person who expresses vigorous disapproval of Hillary Clinton after months of reading
electronic bulletins on “femi-nazis” from Rush Limbaugh and subscribing to anti-feminist
Usenet news groups is no different in this regard than the person who reads a judicious mixture
of New York Times op-ed pieces and scholarly literature on feminism before venturing to
express an opinion regarding Mrs. Clinton’s conduct.  When the two readers choose to express
their own views, the First Amendment protects both speakers equally.  Logically, that zone of
protection should encompass the entire series of intellectual transactions through which they
formed the opinions they ultimately chose to express.  Any less protection would chill inquiry,
and as a result, public discourse, concerning politically and socially controversial issues —
precisely those areas where vigorous public debate is most needed, and most sacrosanct.102
The doctrinal groundwork for a right to read anonymously is discernible in the First
Amendment jurisprudence of the McCarthy era.  Even in cases that accepted some degree of
government power to inquire into individual involvement with suspected communist
organizations, the Supreme Court’s opinions reflect a sense that individual freedom to read and
think lie at the heart of the zone of activity that the First Amendment protects.  Thus, for
example, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,103 the Court held that New Hampshire’s Attorney General
could not, in the course of investigating alleged communist activities, inquire into the contents of
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104Id. at 251-55; id. at 261-66 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment).
105Id. at 250-51 (“Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and
to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and
die.”); see also id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) (“For society’s good — if
understanding be an essential need of society — inquiries into [intellectual] problems,
speculations about them, stimulation in others of reflection upon them, must be left as unfettered
as possible.”).
106390 U.S. 17 (1968).
107Id. at 24-25; see also United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1953) (holding that
statutory authority to investigate “lobbying activities” did not confer power to compel names of
those who purchased political literature for subsequent distribution).
108381 U.S. 301 (1965).
109394 U.S. 557 (1969).
a university professor’s lectures.104  Although no analysis commanded a majority of the Court, six
Justices made clear their view that the line of questioning pursued by the state threatened a core
First Amendment interest in freedom of intellectual inquiry.105  In other cases, such as Schneider
v. Smith,106 the Court construed statutes empowering legislative investigation into “subversive”
activities narrowly, to preclude a broad authorization to “probe the reading habits” of
individuals.107
The most direct support for a right to read anonymously appears in Lamont v. Postmaster
General108 and Stanley v. Georgia.109  In Lamont, the Court struck down a postal regulation that
authorized interception of mail classified as communist propaganda and required addressees to
specially notify the postal service of their desire to receive the material.  The regulation
invalidated in Lamont concerned government surveillance of the mails, rather than a more
general right of anonymity.  Nonetheless, the Court’s reasoning supports a broader application. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Clark relied on the chilling effect that disclosure of individual
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110Lamont, 381 U.S. at 307.
111Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
112Stanley, 394 U.S. at 563-65.
113Id. at 565-66.
114Id. at 565.
115See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.25 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152 (1973).  Arguably, the right of informational privacy recognized in Whalen and Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977), also could be used to protect the
confidentiality of individual reading decisions, at least to an extent.  See Froomkin, supra note 1,
at 492-94; George P. Long, III, Note, Who Are You?  Identity and Anonymity in Cyberspace, 55
U.
 
PITT. L. REV. 1177, 1189-93 (1994).  One recent commentary characterizes the right at issue
in Stanley as that of “privacy of thought.”  See Claudia Tuchman, Note, Does Privacy Have Four
reading preferences would produce, and reasoned that the regulation was “almost certain to have
a deterrent effect” on individuals’ ability to receive reading materials of their choice.110 
Accordingly, he concluded, the regulation was “at war with the ‘uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open’ debate and discussion that are contemplated by the First Amendment.”111
In Stanley, the Court ruled that a state could not criminalize the private possession of
“obscene” materials — even though it might regulate commercial distribution of the identical
reading materials.”112  Justice Marshall’s majority opinion characterized the state’s argument as,
in essence, “the assertion that the State has the right to control the moral content of a person’s
thoughts,” and termed that objective “wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First
Amendment.”113  Again, the opinion contains language supporting a broader right of anonymity
with respect to one’s choice of reading material.  The Court described the right being asserted as
“the right to satisfy [one’s] intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of [one’s] own home”
and “the right to be free from state inquiry into the contents of [one’s] library.”114  This is privacy
language, and has been recognized as such, but it is anonymity language as well.115
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Walls?  Salvaging Stanley v. Georgia, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2267, 2280-82 (1994).  Professor
Kreimer locates a right of anonymity in constitutional privacy doctrine as part of a “freedom of
intimate self-definition.”  See Kreimer, supra note 1, at 12, 69-71.  Without question,
“informational privacy” and anonymity concerns are closely related.  As both Kreimer and
Tuchman recognize, however, a pure constitutional privacy framework alone will not justify or
protect the full range of anonymity concerns.  See Kreimer, supra note 1, at 69-71, 131-43
(constructing a combined privacy and First Amendment rationale for a right of anonymity with
respect to intimate information and “[s]elf-regarding activities crucial to personal identity”);
Tuchman, supra, at 2280-82 (analyzing “privacy of thought” in First Amendment terms); see
also infra notes 216-17, at 1032-33 (discussing “anonymity” issues as a unique subset of
“privacy” issues).
The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Bibles, 83 F.3d
1168 (9th Cir. 1996), illustrates this distinction.  The case involved a Freedom of Information
Act request for the names of individuals on the mailing list for a newsletter distributed by the
Bureau of Land Management.  The court held that the privacy rights of the affected individuals
did not bar disclosure because “the majority” of them had asked to be placed on the mailing list,
and because disclosure was sought in order to send newsletter recipients additional materials
dealing with the same subject matter.  Id. at 1171-73.  Thus, in effect, it reasoned that a request
for reading material may waive any interest in having the request kept confidential.  The former
type of consent should not so easily be read to imply the latter.  (If the federal government funded
abortions, could it be required to disclose the names of individuals who had requested
information about such services, so that they could be targeted for private anti-abortion
mailings?)  If the court had considered First Amendment-based anonymity concerns, the result
might — and, I would argue, should — have been different.
116See Ault, supra note 87, at 1543-46; see also O’Neil, supra note 87, at 219-20
(characterizing Lamont as an unconstitutional conditions case).  The definitive treatment of the
“chilling effect” as an independent and suffcient basis for according First Amendment protection
is Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment:  Unraveling the “Chilling Effect”, 58
B.U.L.
 
REV. 685 (1978).
117See United States v. Twelve 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973);
United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973); see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990)
The right to read anonymously implicit in Lamont and Stanley is predicated on the likely
chilling effect that exposure of a reader’s tastes would have on expressive conduct, broadly
understood — not only speech itself, but also the information-gathering activities that precede
speech.116  More recently, the Court has held that Stanley’s “zone of privacy” extends only to the
home, and thus does not protect even private individuals’ importation or transportation of
obscene material for their personal use.117  However, the Court also has reaffirmed Stanley’s First
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(holding Stanley inapplicable in cases involving the private possession of child pornography
because of the compelling state interest in protecting children from being used as pornographers’
subjects). Osborne, in particular, makes clear that a sufficiently important government interest
may override whatever rights of anonymity or privacy readers have.  Osborne, 495 U.S. at
108-10; see infra pp. 1026-27.  For a persuasive critique of the “spatial” conception of privacy
developed in the post-Stanley cases, see Tuchman, supra note 115.
The Court’s focus on the privacy of the home also suggests that any right to read
anonymously might apply only to digital information accessed through a home computer system
— and not, for example, to information accessed using computer facilities provided by one’s
employer.  Since many individuals (including this author) connect to the Internet via an
employer-provided link, the answer to this question could significantly affect the practical extent
of First Amendment protection for individual reading activity.  See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The
Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1748-49 (1995) (describing how the systems operator at
a university might easily monitor users’ activities).  In general, employee rights against
surveillance by private employers are a function of federal and state privacy law.  See, e.g., Julie
A. Flanagan, Note, Restricting Electronic Monitoring in the Private Workplace, 43 DUKE L.J.
1256, 1264-71 (1994); Larry O. Gantt, An Affront to Human Dignity:  Electronic Mail
Monitoring in the Private Sector Workplace, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 345 (1995); David Neil King,
Note, Privacy Issues in the Private-Sector Workplace:  Protection from Electronic Surveillance
and the Emerging “Privacy Gap”, 67 S.
 
CAL. L. REV. 441 (1994); Note, Addressing New
Hazards of the High Technology Workplace, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1898 (1991).  Federal and state
employers are directly subject to the First Amendment, but may in some circumstances limit the
exercise of employee First Amendment rights for administrative reasons; the extent of this
authority has been hotly disputed. See, e.g., United States v. National Treasury Employees Union,
115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 1061 (1994); Rankin v. McPherson, 483
U.S. 378 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
563 (1967); Leslie S. Blickenstaff, Don’t Tip the Scales!  The Actual Malice Standard
Unjustifiably Eliminates First Amendment Protection for Public Employees’ Recklessly False
Statements, 70 MINN. L. REV. 2911 (1996).  The question whether current law affords adequate
protection to the reading activities of employees, public or private, is beyond the scope of this
Article.
118See Bowers v. Hardwick, 475 U.S. 186, 195 (1986) (characterizing Stanley as “firmly
grounded in the First Amendment[’s]” prohibition against thought control); Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65-67 (1973) (distinguishing refusal to protect distribution of obscene
materials from “control of reason and the intellect”).
Amendment-based recognition of a right of freedom of thought and intellectual inquiry — a right
that necessarily includes the freedom to read unobserved.118  Logically, the same principles that
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119Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.  Whether the identical conduct by private copyright owners
implicates state action sufficient to trigger First Amendment protection is discussed in Part V,
infra.
120116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
121Id. at 2390-96.  Although six members of the Court agreed that the segregation
provision was unconstitutional as worded, they were divided as to the appropriate level of
scrutiny.  See id. at 2391 (suggesting that intermediate scrutiny might be required); id. at 2407-19
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)
(arguing that strict scrutiny should apply).
122Id. at 2390 (citing Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965)).  The Ninth
Circuit’s recent decision to require the Bureau of Land Management to disclose the names of
individuals who had asked to be placed on its mailing list, though based entirely on a privacy
rationale, appears inconsistent with this reasoning.  See Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Bibles,
83 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 1996); supra note 115.
forbid the state from “inquir[ing] into the contents of [one’s] library” also forbid it from
monitoring additions to one’s library as they are acquired.”119
The Court’s recent decision in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications
Consortium, Inc.  (“DAETC”) v. FCC120 appears based in part on this reader’s right of
anonymity.  DAETC concerned distribution of and access to material deemed merely indecent
rather than obscene, and therefore eligible for First Amendment protection.  The Court struck
down a statutory provision requiring cable system operators to segregate “patently offensive”
programming on a separate channel and to make that channel available to viewers only upon
receipt of a written request, on the ground that the statute was more restrictive than necessary to
protect minors.121  Citing Lamont, the Court indicated that the First Amendment rights at stake
included those of “subscribers who fear for their reputations should the operator, advertently or
inadvertently, disclose the list of those who wish to watch the ‘patently offensive’ channel.”122 
Beyond this single sentence, however, the Court offered no further discussion of the nature or
extent of subscribers’ First Amendment rights.  The Third Circuit’s opinion in Fabulous
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123896 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1990).
124Id. at 785 (quoting Lamont, 381 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
125115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
126Id. at 1516-17; see also Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960) (invalidating
city ordinance prohibiting the anonymous distribution of handbills).
Associates, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,123 which invalidated Pennsylvania
regulations requiring users of dial-a-porn services to preregister for personalized “access codes,”
contains a slightly more detailed analysis.  The court reasoned that “the First Amendment
protects against government ‘inhibition as well as prohibition,’” including the “inhibitory effect”
created by a requirement that would-be listeners identify themselves.124
Above and beyond the chilling effects that flow from intrusion on reader anonymity,
however, such anonymity has inherent First Amendment value.  Last Term, in McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission,125 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that anonymity occupies a central place
in the First Amendment lexicon.  At issue was an Ohio statute that prohibited the distribution of
anonymous literature designed to influence the outcome of an election.  Observing that
anonymous advocacy has a long and distinguished literary and political history, the Court held
that an author’s decision to remain anonymous is a decision about the content of his or her
speech, and, as such, entitled to First Amendment protection.126
A similar analysis applies where reader anonymity is concerned.  The freedom to read
anonymously is just as much a part of our tradition, and the choice of reading materials just as
expressive of identity, as the decision to use or withhold one’s name.  Indeed, based purely on
tradition, the freedom to read anonymously may be even more fundamental than the freedom to
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127See McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1526-28 (Thomas, J., concurring) (chronicling
Founding-era attempts to require authors of news articles and pamphlets to disclose their
identities); Talley, 362 U.S. at 64-65 (describing punishments inflicted by English courts on
individuals who refused to disclose information that might lead to discovery of anonymous or
pseudonymous authors’ identities).
128This terminology is borrowed from Jeffrey H. Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon:  A
Philosophical Exploration of the Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the
Future, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 27, 4344 (1995).  Reiman defines
“material conditions” for privacy as the “physical realities that hinder others in gathering
information about or experiences of you.”  Id. at 43.  He observes that the new monitoring
technologies establish the “material conditions for invasion of privacy on unheard-of scale.”  Id.
at 44.  This analysis fits the particular case of copyright management technologies uncomfortably
well.
The fact that nearly all states have enacted statutes to protect the confidentiality of library
circulation records (low-tech and less pervasive precursors of digital copyright management
systems) is compelling evidence of the high value placed by the general public on the freedom to
read anonymously.  See infra note 213.
129Cf. Anne W. Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability:  Challenges to the
First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE
 
L.J. 1639, 1644 (1995); Reiman, supra note 128, at
38-42 (arguing that such intrusions, if pervasive, will deprive individuals of “self-ownership” and
stunt their inner emotional and intellectual lives).  Arguably, therefore, requiring readers to
disclose their identities might constitute unconstitutional compulsion.  Cf. Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (holding that state motto on license plate constituted a form of
compelled speech and that defendant’s prosecution for removing motto violated his First
Amendment rights); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (holding
that compelling public school students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance in violation of their
religious beliefs offended the First Amendment).
engage in anonymous political speech.  Anonymous advocacy has always been controversial.127 
Anonymous reading, in contrast, is something that is taken for granted.  The material conditions
for non-anonymous reading — the technologies that enable content providers to monitor readers’
activities and choices — have only recently come to exist.128  With them has come the realization
that the act of reading communicates, and that our tradition of anonymous exploration and
inquiry is threatened.  Reader profiles are valuable to marketers precisely because they disclose
information about the reader’s tastes, preferences, interests, and beliefs.  That information is
content that the reader should have a constitutionally protected interest in refusing to share.129 
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130See, e.g., McIntyre, 115 S. Ct. at 1536-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that speaker
identification requirements are desirable because they promote accountability for false and
harmful statements); Branscomb, supra note 129, at 1644; Froomkin, supra note 1, at 401-04; A.
Michael Froomkin, Anonymity and Its Enmities, 1 J.
 
ONLINE L. art. 4, ¶¶ 50-52 (1995), available
online http://www.law.comell.edu/jol/froomkin.html (characterizing the accountability argument
as “the strongest moral objection to the increase in anonymous interaction” on the Internet);
Kreimer, supra note 1, at 78-88.  But see Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid of Anonymous Speech?
McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 117, 152 (arguing that the accountability argument
“ultimately reduces to a concern about ordinary individuals, not ‘responsible’ elites, engaging in
speech without being vertically filtered”).
131Unauthorized access to information held as a trade secret may cause injury.  In such
cases, anonymous access might properly be denied for other reasons.  See infra note 149 and
accompanying text.
132See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963);
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449 (1958).
133NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 460-62.  Thus, although the Court identified the right
of associational anonymity as grounded in the assembly clause of the First Amendment, it noted
“the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.”  Id. at 460.
NAACP v. Alabama was the stated basis for the only reported First Amendment challenge
to a prosecutor’s attempt to subpoena library circulation records.  The court summarily rejected
the constitutional argument without deciding whether NAACP might be read to afford a right to
reader anonymity.  Brown v. Johnston, 328 N.W.2d 510, 512-13 (Iowa), cert. denied, 463 U.S.
1208 (1993).
Moreover, the most powerful justification advanced for requiring speakers to disclose their
identities — an asserted need to ensure speaker accountability for harms to others resulting from
defamation, harassment, and the like130 — does not apply to readers, for the mere act of reading
cannot injure.131
Last but not least, reading is an important dimension of the individual right of
associational freedom.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is a constitutionally
protected right of associational anonymity.132  As first articulated in NAACP v. Alabama, this
protection is in part a function of the expressive aspects of association and of the chill that
disclosure of unpopular associations might impose.133  It has also been argued that a right of
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134See Tien, supra note 130.
anonymity in one’s interpersonal affiliations protects the individual’s right to construct his or her
identity without public scrutiny.134  Reading is intellectual association, pure and simple.  As such,
it is as profoundly constitutive of identity as direct interpersonal association.  There are reasons
for according even stronger protection to reading, moreover.  Interpersonal association and group
affiliation are, by definition, voluntary expressions of a common purpose or interest.  Although
disclosure of one’s affiliations may chill protected conduct, the information revealed by such
disclosure is, at least, accurate.  In contrast, one may not wish to affiliate oneself with the authors
of some materials one chooses to read; indeed, one may affirmatively wish otherwise.  I may read
The Turner Diaries or The Fountainhead for purely scholarly reasons, without any intent or
desire to associate myself with the movements they have come to represent.  To the extent that
the dangers of being labeled by one’s reading choices are greater than the dangers of being
labeled by one’s choice of associates, the case for First Amendment protection of association
through reading is correspondingly stronger.
Lamont and Stanley, DAETC, McIntyre, and NAACP v. Alabama all suggest the
glimmerings of judicial recognition of a broad right of anonymity extending to all of the
constitutive activities of communication.  As discussion above suggests, to describe this right as
merely derivative of the First Amendment’s express guarantee of freedom of speech begs the
question of antecedence.  While it might be correct to say that we should recognize a right to read
anonymously in order to safeguard the right to speak, the activities of speaking and of receiving
information are symbiotic; one cannot exist without the other, and any definition of “speech” in
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135See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(characterizing as “equally fundamental” the rights “necessary to make the [First Amendment’s]
express guarantees fully meaningful”).
136International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 697 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consonium,
Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2402-03 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (analyzing the danger of
establishing fixed legal standards for rapidly developing technology).
137See, e.g., United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1015
(1995); Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-68
(plurality) (1982); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1972); Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
the constitutional sense properly encompasses both.135  A First Amendment jurisprudence for the
new information age should expressly reflect and affirm this broad definition.  As four justices of
the Supreme Court recently acknowledged, “in times of fast-changing technology,” the doctrines
developed “to give effect to the broad command of the First Amendment to protect speech from
government interference” must be construed in light of this underlying purpose.136  Now that
digital copyright management technology has made it possible to monitor reading habits,
preferences regarding political commentary, artistic tastes — in short, to intrude to an
unprecedented degree on private intellectual activity of all types — the doctrines that protect
“speech” must be reshaped to ensure that the protection they afford is not diminished.
Where anonymous access to privately-owned digital works is sought, however, readers’
rights do not exist in a vacuum.  The rights and freedoms of private copyright owners also must
be considered.  First, to the extent that the Supreme Court’s First Amendment decisions
recognize a right to read, they expressly or implicitly characterize that right as the right to receive
information from a willing speaker.137  This formulation suggests that the right to read is not
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138First Amendment rights assume slightly different contours where children are involved.
See, e.g., Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (holding that children may be
shielded from speech that is not “obscene” by adult standards); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (holding that, although children do not shed
their First Amendment rights at the schoolhouse door, those rights must be interpreted “in light
of the special characteristics of school environment”).  It is reasonable to assume that a right to
read anonymously would be no different in this regard.  For example, some leeway to inquire
whether school children have done their assigned reading seems unwarranted.  The discussion in
this Article presupposes adult readers.
139Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
140See Lee, supra note 87, at 324-25.
141This formulation of the right to read also raises the question whether, in some
circumstances, there might be an affirmative right of access to information that trumps the
speaker’s right to withhold it.  This Article does not address that question.
142471 U.S. 539 (1985).
143Id. at 558.
absolute.138  There is no right, for example, to force information from one who is unwilling to
speak.139  The right to read, thus formulated, is the correlative of the right to speak — no
narrower in scope, perhaps, but certainly no broader.140  As a preliminary matter, then, any
discussion of a right to read anonymously must consider whether an online information provider
that declines to do business with an anonymous would-be customer is simply exercising its own
First Amendment right not to “speak” to a unknown audience.141
The Supreme Court has suggested that an author’s right to control the public distribution
of his or her work has a constitutional dimension.  In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises,142 which involved the unauthorized release of excerpts from a soon-to-be-published
book, the Court made clear that its refusal to invoke the fair use doctrine was motivated in part
by concern for the author’s First Amendment rights.  The Court observed that the Framers of the
Constitution “intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.”143  It reasoned that
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144Id. at 559-60.
145Id. at 555, 559-60; see also Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir.)
(holding that an author has a right “to protect the expressive content of his unpublished
writings”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
146Although the right of creative control sketched by the Harper & Row Court might seem
personal to the author, the Court did not raise this issue, but allowed a publisher to assert the
right on the author’s behalf.  Moreover, innumerable decisions according publishers the status of
First Amendment speakers make clear that publishers, too, have their own rights not to speak.
See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 2345-46
(1995); Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2456 (1994); Miami Herald
Publish. Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
147For purposes of this inquiry, it is not significant that a digital work may be the subject
of regular revisions and updates after it is released to the general public.  The dispositive question
is not whether the work is “final,” but whether some version of it is made available for
acquisition by interested readers.  See Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of
Electronic Vigilantism:  Intellectual Property Implications of “Lock-Out” Programs,68 S.
 
CAL.
copyright policies reserving control over distribution to the author serve First Amendment as
well as copyright purposes.  In particular, authors enjoy the same right not to speak accorded
other speakers.144  Copyright protects this right by securing to authors a right of creative control
— a right not to publish ideas before they have been developed and polished to the author’s
satisfaction.145
Arguably, Harper & Row might be read to stand for the proposition that authors and their
publishers also have a constitutionally protected right to refuse — for whatever reason — to
distribute “their” works to anonymous readers.146  However, Harper & Row addressed only the
relatively narrow issue of the author’s right to control the circumstances surrounding the first
publication of a work.  The reasoning that supports recognition of a First Amendment right with
respect to initial publication does not necessarily indicate anything about the constitutional rights
of authors and/or publishers with respect to works that have been judged ready for release and
have been made available for electronic distribution.147  For such works, the right of creative
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REV. 1091, 1113 (1995).
148Cf. Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43
UCLA
 
L.
 
REV. 1 (1995) (suggesting that public rights of access to a copyrighted work should
turn on whether or not the work has been “commercialized”).  Without more information as to
what “commercialization” means—in particular, whether a copyright owner could argue that
distribution to a small number of licensees is not enough to trigger Professor Kreiss’ quid pro
quo—I am not necessarily prepared to agree that commercialization should be the only criterion
for access to a work.  With a similar caveat, however, a commercialization or “general
distribution” test provides a useful basis for assessing the plausibility of a copyright owner’s
claim that particular contract terms are necessary to effectuate its constitutional right not to
speak.
149For similar reasons, it make sense to argue that in some circumstances a sender of
electronic mail could refuse to “speak” to anonymous “listeners.”  This Article has focused
primarily on more traditional works of authorship—literature, musical compositions, and so
on—that are offered for public distribution online.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).  In
cyberspace, one method of distinguishing between such works and more conversational
communications is lost, since in both cases, the medium of transmission is the same.  See, e.g.,
Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway:  The
Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
345, 389-90 (1995) (arguing that the new digital media “create a continuum” between modes of
communication traditionally viewed as private and those traditionally viewed as public); Henry
H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability, the First Amendment, and Effectual Access to Electronic Networks,
5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 67 (1992) (observing that the line of demarcation between electronic
publishing and private electronic conversation is blurred).  Nonetheless, it is difficult to argue
that distribution of so-called traditional works via personalized electronic “communication”
supports a right-not-to-speak claim.  Although a novel certainly is speech in the constitutional
sense, see Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558-60, in “real” (as opposed to cyber-) space, the
decisions to write and publish it are separate, both temporally and logically, from later
purchase-and-sale transactions with individual customers.
control is no longer implicated.  The only question is the terms on which the reader will be
permitted to acquire a copy.148
One can envision circumstances in which the reader’s identity might nonetheless matter a
great deal to the author or publisher of a completed work.  For example, the Church of
Scientology might prefer that its literature be made available only to its own members.  For such
limited distribution works — works intended exclusively for a particular, limited audience — a
right to refuse to engage in anonymous transactions makes sense.149  The vast majority of works,
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It is worth noting, moreover, that many electronic mail conversations both “look” and
“feel” more like traditional, published works in this regard.  For example, posts to
open-subscription Internet listservs or Usenet discussion groups are inherently public in
nature—they are conversations with many listeners, most of whom remain silent and
unidentified, and there are no membership restrictions.  Accordingly, any attempt to use a
right-not-to-speak claim to defeat anonymous access to listserv or Usenet posts would be
implausible.
One way to determine whether a work or communication belongs in the “limited
audience” category might be whether the information it contains qualifies as a trade secret.  See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995); Uniform Trade Secrets Act
§ 1(4).  By definition, a trade secret’s value inheres in its continuing secrecy, which its owner
should remain free to protect.  However, the requirement that a trade secret confer an economic
advantage on its owner may be a difficult standard for some claimants to meet.  See, e.g.,
Religious Technology Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1090 (9th Cir. 1986) (“We do not
accept that a trade secret can be based on the spiritual advantage the Church [of Scientology]
believes its adherents acquire over non-adherents by using the materials in the prescribed
manner.” (emphasis in original)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103 (1987).  Nor is an “economic
advantage” test necessarily appropriate for determining when an author-speaker may invoke First
Amendment rights.
150Once armed with reader identifying information, some copyright owners who hold their
works out for general distribution might seek to engage in price discrimination or private
censorship with respect to particular individuals or groups.  Whether this is a good thing, a bad
thing, or a mixed blessing is a subject on which reasonable minds will differ.  Charging lower
rates to educators, for example, does not seem invidious.  See Weber, supra note 4 (suggesting
that some copyright owners may wish to implement a variable royalty schedule that, for example,
charges more for commercial uses than for educational ones); see also Stefik, supra note 4, at 23
(envisioning grants of “special rights to certified librarians, researchers, and teachers”). 
However, one can imagine discriminatory policies that are far less benign.  The economics and
ethics of price discrimination and private censorship are vast topics, and I will not pursue them
here.  It is worth noting, though, that reliance on the market to suppress the more irrational
instances of discriminatory pricing may be misplaced, for the reasons discussed in Part III, supra.
however, are offered to anyone who wishes to acquire them.  Even works that have a limited
audience because of their subject matter — for example, many scientific and technical
publications — typically are made available to all who are interested.  As to these “general
distribution” works, the copyright owner wants identifying information for its own recordkeeping
purposes, rather than because some identifying characteristic of the reader would affect its
decision whether or not to distribute the work to that particular reader.150  When an identification
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151Nor, as Part III demonstrates, may copyright owners fall back on arguments about
freedom of contract to justify a preference for standardized electronic contracts that
unconditionally require the surrender of anonymity.
152See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108-10 (1990) (declining to recognize a
constitutionally protected right to receive child pornography, in light of the compelling state
interest in protecting children from abuse).  Thus, for example, the deeply-rooted presumption
that reading habits are sacrosanct coexists with another line of cases that accept without question
judicial power to inquire into individual reading habits in particular circumstances.  Most
notably, a criminal defendant may question prospective jurors as to their choice of reading
material in an effort to identify prior knowledge or bias.  See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 542
F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hearst, 466 F. Supp. 1068, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 1978),
modified, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1981).  Arguably, however,
these cases stand for no more than the ordinary proposition that the government may impose
rules that incidentally but evenhandedly burden the exercise of First Amendment rights for
sufficiently substantial reasons.  See infra page 1026.
requirement serves administrative or copyright management purposes only, the copyright
owner’s First Amendment argument is at its weakest.
The force of the argument that the Constitution protects a copyright owner’s right to
require identifying information from readers, then, depends on the type of work to which it is
applied.  A copyright owner may prefer not to sell to nameless individuals, but in the vast
majority of cases the First Amendment will not support that preference in the same way that it
supports the right to control first publication.151  When a copyright owner’s desire for identifying
information is motivated simply by copyright management concerns, the reader’s right of
anonymity should prevail.
A second and more important argument, however, is that the First Amendment can
guarantee anonymous access to privately-owned works only to the extent that state action is
implicated in copyright owners’ efforts to deny such access.  Even then, the right to read
anonymously, like other First Amendment rights, may be subject to restrictions so long as the
restrictions survive the appropriate level of scrutiny.152  In Fabulous, for example, the Third
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153Fabulous Assocs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, 896 F.2d 780, 786 (3d Cir.
1990); see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2392
(1996) (discussing lesser restrictions imposed on cable operators and subscribers by other
statutory provisions).
154S. 1284 & H.R. 2441, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1995) (proposed §§ 1201 and 1202 of
the Copyright Act) (emphasis added).
Circuit had little difficulty deciding that the government interest in ensuring that pornography is
not distributed to children could entail some sacrifice of anonymity on the part of adult
dial-a-porn recipients.153  It is against this background that the constitutionality of the proposed
protection for anonymity-destroying copyright management efforts must be examined.
V.
  
THE FIRST AMENDMENT CASE AGAINST THE PROPOSED
ANTI-TAMPERING LAW
The existence of a right to read anonymously, in the abstract, does little to guarantee
individual readers protection against private conduct.  The First Amendment affords protection
only against governmental conduct that threatens reader anonymity.  How, then, is the right to
read anonymously triggered by the so-called “copyright management” efforts of private content
providers?  Quite simply, it is not — but the proposed anti-tampering provisions of the NIICPA
are a different story.  The proposed Chapter 12 of the Copyright Act would prohibit — and in
some cases, criminalize — efforts to “remove or alter” copyright management information or to
“avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or otherwise circumvent . . . any process, treatment,
mechanism, or system” put in place for copyright protection.154  On their face, these provisions
would reach both the conduct of the willful infringer and that of the concerned libertarian who
tampers with copyright management software only, and only to the extent necessary, to preserve
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155Whether the willful infringer, as well the concerned libertarian, would or should be
permitted to assert an overbreadth challenge is a topic beyond the scope of this Article.  For
helpful discussions of the “third-party standing” aspect of the First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine, see Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 235, 261-64 (1994); and Richard H. Fallon, Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J.
853 (1991).
156But see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (finding state action in private property
owners’ use of the court system to enforce racially restrictive covenant).
157See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522, 544 (1987) (“All enforceable rights in trademarks are created by some governmental act
. . . .  The actions of trademark owners nevertheless remain private.”).
158See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216-17 (1985); Harper & Row, Publishers
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555-60 (1985) (“First Amendment protections . . . [are]
embodied in the Copyright Act’s distinction between copyrightable expression and
uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and in the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally
afforded by fair use.”); Los Angeles News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1992);
New Era Publications Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 1989), cert denied,
493 U.S. 1094 (1990); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d
1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980); Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Maxtone-Grahum v. Burtchaell, 631 F.
Supp. 1432, 1435 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059
(1987); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171 (1994) (holding that
commercial character of song parody did not create a presumption against fair use); W. Warren
Hamel, Harper & Row v. The Nation:  A First Amendment Privilege for News Reporting of
his or her anonymity.155  Arguably, enforcement of these provisions supplies the requisite
government action.  If so, their breadth cannot be justified by any governmental interest.
Merely using the judicial system to enforce a property right — or even a
government-created quasi-property right — doesn’t usually constitute state action.156  Thus, for
example, the Supreme Court has held that the federally-created nature of trademark rights does
not automatically import state action into every lawsuit for trademark infringement.157  The
Court’s analysis applies equally to copyright infringement actions.  However, it is also
well-accepted that the scope of copyright protection is limited by the First Amendment, by way
of judicially-developed doctrines such as fair use and the idea/expression distinction.158  These
-53-
Copyrightable Material?, 19 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 253, 290-91 (1985) (arguing that the
first amendment controls when copyright and free speech considerations clash); Melville B.
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?,
17 UCLA L.
 
REV. 1180 (1970) (discussing the need to balance copyright and free speech
interests).  As the above quote from Harper & Row indicates, both the idea/expression distinction
and the fair use doctrine were incorporated into the 1976 Copyright Act.  See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 102(b), 107 (1994).
Some have argued that in addition, the First Amendment should provide a separate,
independent defense to charges of copyright infringement in some situations.  See, e.g., Robert C.
Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech:  Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of
Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1979); see also Diane L. Zimmerman, Information as Speech,
Information as Goods:  Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY
L.
 
REV. 665 (1992) (exploring the conflicts between the claims of authorship and those of the
public domain where speech rights are concerned).  This issue will become considerably more
important if the courts and Congress conclude that copyright does not preempt private license
terms that are inconsistent with substantive copyright policies.  See supra notes 3, at 85.
159See Hamel, supra note 158, at 290-91 (observing that the First Amendment limits
congressional power to define copyright just as it limits “other federal laws restricting
expression”); cf. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991) (application of state rule
of law in a manner that restricts First Amendment freedoms constitutes state action); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
160For general discussions of the evolution of the public/private distinction and its internal
contradictions, see Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory:  A Casenote on Flagg Brothers
v. Brooks, 130 U.
 
PA. L. REV. 1296 (1982); Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U.
 
PA. L. REV. 1423 (1982); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the
doctrines reflect a recognition that allowing certain private uses of the copyright laws would
threaten constitutionally-protected interests.  A finding of state action is implicit in this
conclusion, and is neither far-fetched nor doctrinally unsound.  Although the Constitution
empowers Congress to confer and define the scope of copyright protection, and the courts to
interpret the congressional mandate, neither may do so in a way that the First Amendment
forbids.159  The question, then, is how to characterize a legislative act that allows the institution
of, and enforces compliance with, private copyright management regimes.
As the preceding paragraph suggests, the public/private distinction that forms the basis of
state action doctrine is particularly problematic as applied to copyright law.160  Even in the case
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161Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
162See United States v. Dowling, 473 U.S. 207, 216 (1985) (“The copyright owner,
however, holds no ordinary chattel.  A copyright . . . comprises a series of carefully defined and
carefully delimited interests to which the law affords correspondingly exact protection.”); Elkin-
Koren, supra note 99, at 391-92; Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: 
The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343,
1370-71 (1989); Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia Ann Krauthaus, Copyright on the Information
Superhighway:  Requiem for a Middleweight, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 25, 27, 29-30 (1994).
163See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) (listing the exclusive rights given to copyright owners); id.
§ 109(a); Elkin-Koren, supra note 99, at 391-92; Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 162, at 29-30.
164See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 107.
165Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-60 (1985);
Nimmer, supra note 158, at 1186-93; cf. Elkin-Koren, supra note 99, at 392 (“[C]opyright
doctrine mediates public interest in the production of information and the public interest in
access to information.”).
of real property, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[o]wnership does not always mean
absolute dominion,” and that in some circumstances an owner’s rights may “become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use” the property.161 
Copyright, unlike real property, reflects a careful, expressly-drawn balance between private
(author’s) rights and public rights.162  Thus, for example, the Copyright Act does not give a
copyright owner the right to control a reader’s private use of a lawfully acquired copy of his or
her work.163  In addition, as I have mentioned, the Act withholds copyright protection from ideas,
processes, and the like, and also allows members of the public to make fair use of protected
expression.164  These public rights are intended to stimulate the creation of new copyrightable
works, but they also are intended to safeguard the public’s freedom of expression.165  Any
congressional act that appears to allow copyright owners to alter them at will should be carefully
scrutinized.  The anti-tampering provisions of the NIICPA fare poorly under such scrutiny.
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168See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 195-97 (1988); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351-52 (1974).  The contract-policing function may be delegated to a private
arbitrator, but only with the consent of the affected parties.  As discussed in Part III, supra, that
requirement is not met here.
169436 U.S. 149 (1978).
170See id. at 157, 160 n.10.  Professor Tribe argues that private self-help should constitute
state action in cases where such self-help is expressly authorized by law.  LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §18-5, at 1706-07 (2d ed. 1988).  Thus far, the Court has not
agreed.
171See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 162 n.l2 (“This is not to say that dispute resolution
between creditors and debtors involves a category of human affairs that is never subject to
constitutional constraints.”).
The NIICPA superimposes upon the existing framework of copyright and contract law an
additional layer of private legislation regarding the terms and conditions of access to copyrighted
works.166  The law’s effect, and apparent intent, is to ensure that these private terms are
automatically honored, whatever their merits or defects as a matter of contract or copyright
doctrine or policy.167  In effect, then, the NIICPA delegates the enforcement of contracts — a core
public function traditionally carried out by the judicial system — to private copyright owners.168 
In Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks,169 the Supreme Court indicated that private resolution of a
commercial dispute ordinarily will not implicate state action.170  The proposed anti-tampering
law, however, does not merely facilitate private ordering within an existing legal framework, but
constitutes a wholesale delegation of power to both make the rules and prevent their violation. 
The Flagg Brothers Court expressly declined to hold that private dispute resolution could never
run afoul of constitutional limits.171  Arguably, a law that authorizes private re-ordering of rights
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172Cf. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2383-85
(1996) (plurality) (assuming that a statute allowing but not requiring specified private conduct
may implicate the First Amendment).  The argument that First Amendment considerations are
woven into the fabric of copyright doctrine is, of course, also an argument in favor of finding
copyright preemption of pervasive private contract terms that alter the balance between public
and private that Congress and the courts have sought to maintain.  See supra notes 3, 158.
173See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 159-62.  The proposed Article 2B of the Uniform
Commercial Code, an effort to set default rules for the licensing of intangibles, would allow a
licensee to challenge contract terms on grounds of unconscionability, but as of this writing does
not appear to authorize a licensee to raise such a challenge separately from and prior to its own
breach.  See U.C.C. § 2B-110 (Draft Revised Art. 2B 1996), available online
http://www.lawlib.uh.edu/ucc2b/0503/0503_2b.html.
174As currently worded, both of the NIICPA’s prohibitions against tampering generously
allow a tamperer to raise the defense of authorization by law.  See S. 1284 & H.R. 2441, 104th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1995) (proposed §§ 1201 and 1202 of the Copyright Act).
defined in part by the First Amendment presents an appropriate situation for the imposition of
such constraints.172
The anti-tampering regime established by the NIICPA is distinguishable from the private
self-help at issue in Flagg Brothers in two ways, moreover.  First, the NIICPA contains no
provision that would allow an individual reader to seek a remedy for copyright management
practices perceived as unfair.  Rather, it appears that the anti-tampering provisions of the NIICPA
will be the exclusive means afforded for mediating conflicts regarding digitally-imposed access
restrictions.173  Requirements imposed by a copyright owner’s standard-form electronic contract
and enforced by its copyright management software may be challenged only by violating the
anti-tampering provisions, subjecting oneself to prosecution or suit, and raising the desired
challenges as defenses once the machinery of official process has been set in motion.174
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175See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157, 160 n.10; see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 941 (1982).
176See supra pp. 991-992.
177See supra p. 991.
178See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941 (“While private misuse of a . . . statute does not describe
conduct that can be attributed to the State, the procedural scheme created by the statute [which
allowed a party to invoke a state official’s assistance in seizing disputed property] obviously is
the product of state action.”); Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 160 n.10.
179See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1989); United States v. O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 376-77, 381-82 (1968).
Second, unlike the creditor in Flagg Brothers, copyright owners cannot obtain redress for
violations of the proposed anti-tampering law without a government actor’s assistance.175  This is
so regardless of which of the NIICPA’s penalty provisions is invoked.  Criminal prosecution
under proposed section 1204 plainly would constitute state action.176  Beyond dispute, the
government may not prosecute individuals for engaging in constitutionally protected conduct. 
However, government involvement exists even in a civil action under the statute.  As discussed
above, the civil remedies afforded under the proposed anti-tampering law are not remedies for
copyright infringement, but separate civil penalties tied to the act of “tampering” itself.177  This
penalty scheme directly implicates the government in the enforcement, as well as the
authorization, of copyright owners’ private contract regimes.”178
The conclusion that the NIICPA’s penalty provisions should be deemed to supply state
action does not end the inquiry, however.  We also must consider whether the NIICPA’s
restrictions on tampering concern speech at all, or merely “nonspeech” elements of readers’
conduct.  If the latter, they are subject to much more deferential review.179  Thus, in United States
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185O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 375; see Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707 (quoting N.H.
 
REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 262:27-c (Supp. 1975)).
v. O’Brien,180 the Supreme Court held that the government’s interest in maintaining a draft
registration system based on registration certificates was sufficient to justify a law prohibiting
mutilation or destruction of the certificates, notwithstanding any incidental limits the statute
might impose on expressive conduct.181  Arguably, tampering with copyright management
systems is no different.  Other federal statutes criminalize tampering with information stored on
someone else’s computer, and it has never been seriously argued that the First Amendment
prevents their enforcement.182
When reader anonymity is at issue, tampering with copyright management systems to
preserve that anonymity is intimately associated with the exercise of a First Amendment
freedom.  Nine years after O’Brien, in Wooley v. Maynard,183 the Supreme Court held that a state
could not constitutionally punish an individual for tampering with a license plate to obscure the
unwanted message displayed there.184  The Court reached this conclusion even though the statute
at issue, like the statute in O’Brien (and like the NIICPA), “d[id] not punish only destruction
engaged in for the purpose of expressing views.”185  Wooley reflects the Court’s recognition that
the proscribed conduct was the defendant’s only means of preserving his freedom of expression. 
Similarly, failure to engage in the conduct necessary to preserve the freedom to read
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186Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2469 (1994) (citing Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989), and United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).  In
contrast, the court in Fabulous applied strict scrutiny because the regulations at issue were
directed specifically at pornography.  Fabulous Assocs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n,
896 F.2d 780, 784-85 (3d Cir. 1990).
187Turner Broadcasting Sys., 114 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting United States v. O’Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
188See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 1, at 473-77 (predicting government opposition to
anonymous digital cash); see generally Freiwald, supra note 1 (describing the various federal
statutes that govern communications monitoring by law enforcement and analyzing the extent to
which they preserve protection for individual privacy); Froomkin, supra note 21 (describing
government efforts to implement the so-called Clipper encryption standard in order to acquire the
capability to monitor encrypted private communications).
anonymously results in its immediate, irretrievable loss.  In the particular case of anonymity,
then, the anti-tampering provisions of the NIICPA are inextricably bound up with the exercise of
protected rights.
Restrictions on speech unrelated to the content of the burdened speech activities — as the
NIICPA’s anti-tampering provisions plainly are — must survive an “intermediate” level of
scrutiny.186  The case for the proposed anti-tampering law, then, rests on the proposition that the
governmental interests associated with copyright management are “substantial” enough to
warrant invasion of the freedom to read anonymously as a matter of course, and that the
restriction imposed on that freedom “‘is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.’”187  Even the most staunch copyright protectionist should have difficulty making that
argument with a straight face.
The government interest most often invoked to justify intrusive monitoring of electronic
communications — a need to empower law enforcement agencies to detect signs of illicit
activity188 — is peculiarly inapt where copyright management systems are concerned.  First,
given that the NII White Paper expressly disclaims any intent to require copyright owners to
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190Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“If the First Amendment means
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what
books he may read or what films he may watch.”); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 24 (1968);
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1967); see also United States v. Rumely, 345
U.S. 41, 57-58 (1953) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Then the spectre of a government agent will
look over the shoulder of everyone who reads.  The purchase of a book or pamphlet today may
result in a subpoena tomorrow.  Fear of criticism goes with every person into the bookstall.  The
subtle, imponderable pressures of the orthodox lay hold.”).
191See Froomkin, supra note 1, at 501 n.414.  Professor Froomkin suggests that no such
interest supports retention of old circulation records.
192See NII
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193See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (1994).
adopt digital “rights management” systems, it is hard to imagine a plausible argument that law
enforcement needs justify such monitoring of readers’ identities as copyright owners elect.189 
Second, access to preexisting copyrighted works that are held out to the public does not implicate
“communication” of the sort that could serve as a predicate act for a conspiracy or wire fraud
charge.  Rather, the targeted activity is intellectual inquiry — an activity that the Supreme Court
has suggested is entitled to the highest levels of First Amendment protection.  To accept that the
government has a substantial — or even any — need to monitor what citizens read for law
enforcement reasons would negate that guarantee.190  The government interest that supports
public libraries’ maintenance of patron checkout records is different and highly medium-specific. 
Physical libraries have a substantial interest in securing the timely return of loaned materials.191 
In cyberspace, no such interest exists, because the sender’s computer retains the original file and
distributes only copies.192
That copyright infringement may occasionally rise to a level that constitutes criminal
activity does not change the government interest analysis.193  While the government has an
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194See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 114 S. Ct. 912, 914 (1994) (Blackmun, J.) (staying
preliminary injunction barring publication of allegedly defamatory material, and observing that
prior restraint will be allowed only in the most extraordinary circumstances, “where the evil that
would result . . . is both great and certain and cannot be militated by less intrusive measures”).
195Pursuant to the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, § 2, 106
Stat. 4237-40 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-02 (1992)), digital audio recording devices sold in
the United States are already required to incorporate this “serial copy management” technology. 
See supra p. 988 and note 18.
196See supra notes 15, 16 and accompanying text.
obvious interest in preventing wholesale piracy of copyrighted works, that interest is not
implicated, much less threatened, by the actions of individuals who seek to acquire, lawfully but
anonymously, copies of such works for their personal use.  The more general government interest
in protecting private quasi-property rights cannot justify routine monitoring of what people read
any more than the government interest in protecting private reputations against libel or slander
can justify routine monitoring or prior restraint of what people say.194
Even if the government interest in deterring copyright infringement were substantial
enough to justify some restriction on First Amendment freedoms, however, the anti-tampering
provisions of the NIICPA fail the second half of the intermediate scrutiny test.  It is technically
feasible to design copyright management systems that protect the underlying works without
compromising reader anonymity.  For example, a digital work might contain embedded software
that automatically frustrates second-generation copying without reporting the attempted
duplication to the copyright owner.195  Alternatively, the system might collect fees via an
anonymous payment system, or prevent the extraction of reader identifying data.196  Thus, it is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the anti-tampering provisions of the NIICPA are broader
than necessary to protect copyright owners’ legitimate interests.
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obscene by adult standards”); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-62 (1982) (holding child
pornography not entitled to First Amendment protection); FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 733
(1978) (recognizing that certain “forms of offensive expression may be withheld from the
young”).
198See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 635 (1968); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
199American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 855 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(opinion of Sloviter, J.); see also, e.g., Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 487 (1962)
(observing that applying an “indecency” rather than “obscenity” standard “might well put the
American public in jeopardy of being denied access to many worthwhile works in literature
science, or art”).
A slightly more substantial government interest, where reading is concerned, is the
interest in shielding children from “obscene” and “indecent” material.  This interest has been
held compelling in other contexts;197 thus, it is certainly conceivable that it could justify some
limitation on anonymous access to digital works.  Here again, however, the fact that the
government is not planning to require any particular copyright management schemes undercuts
any such argument.  And here again, mandatory disclosure of reader identities is a measure that is
far more restrictive than is necessary to protect the government’s interest.  Obscene material is
considered wholly ineligible for First Amendment protection;198 thus, there is no need to screen
readers by age or any other factor.  The range of material that might be considered indecent is far
too broad and uncertain to define with sufficient clarity.  While it appears that some purveyors of
sexually explicit material, such as the “dial-a-porn” at issue in Fabulous, make attempts to screen
would-be customers, the term “indecent” as defined by the courts “would cover a broad range of
material from contemporary films, plays and books . . . to controversial contemporary art.”199  A
requirement that copyright owners attempt to identify and regulate access to such material would
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200Cf. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2393
(1996) (reiterating that government may not regulate speech in a manner that restricts adults to
reading “only what is fit for children”) (quoting Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,
128 (1989)); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 876 (opinion of Dalzell, J.).  Denial of anonymity in the
interest of ensuring that would-be readers of arguably indecent material are screened as
thoroughly as possible would subject adults to a level of supervision fit for children.
201See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 845-47 (describing available technologies but finding that it
is neither technically nor economically feasible for most non-commercial organizations to use
them); Froomkin, supra note 1, at 413-25 (describing the technology that enables creation of
secure but anonymous digital signatures).
202See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 838-42 (finding such parental-screening systems technically
feasible); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech on the Infobahn from the Listener’s Perspective: 
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lead inexorably to universal screening, and universal denial of anonymity to adult readers — an
unacceptable result.200
For material distributed by commercial pornographers, moreover, it is technically feasible
to design an anonymous “adult password” system, under which of-age readers might obtain
passwords or certificates of majority from a reliable entity unconnected to any particular
purveyor of copyrighted works.201  The government’s interest in protecting children also might
support the argument that copyright owners should design copyright management systems that
support screening software developed for private use.  For example, publishers of digital works
might be required to institute or participate in a rating system, so that parents, elementary
schools, and the like could configure their own systems to deny access (or require a password for
access) to materials rated above a certain level.202  Such a “self-screening” regime would require
no sacrifice of anonymity on the part of adult readers.
In sum, there is a strong argument that the anti-tampering provisions of the NIICPA
encompass conduct protected by the First Amendment and, if enacted, cannot constitutionally be
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Plaintiff’s Standing:  A Practical Approach, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 175 (1994); Jonathan R. Siegal,
Note, Chilling Injuries as a Basis for Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 905 (1989); see also Ault, supra
note 87, at 1547-49.
204See Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546, 557 (2d Cir.) (holding that
provider of dial-a-porn services lacked standing to raise a facial overbreadth challenge to state
access regulations on behalf of would-be listeners who might experience a chilling effect in the
future), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988).
205See Froomkin, supra note 1, at 459-70.
206See supra note 150.
207See Froomkin, supra note 1, at 473-78.
enforced against individuals who exercise technological self-help to protect their freedom to read
anonymously.  One might validly ask, though, where that leaves the rest of us.  The right to
exercise self-help where necessary to protect one’s anonymity may seem cold comfort to the
great majority of consumers who lack the technical wherewithal to do so.  Although some
commentators have argued otherwise,203 merely alleging that the anti-tampering law chills the
exercise of First Amendment rights probably will not confer standing to challenge it.204  What,
then, is the “ordinary” reader to do?
The unavailability of a direct legal challenge to the NIICPA need not mean that
“ordinary” readers will be left without recourse.  As the first line of defense, it is possible that
readers who so choose will be able to pay for works using anonymous digital cash.205  However,
digital cash may not be acceptable to some copyright management systems - for example,
systems designed to extract differential per-use royalties based on the nature of the user as well
as the nature of the use.206  In addition, it is entirely possible that the government will attempt to
prohibit anonymous payment systems for law enforcement reasons.207  Thus, it is more likely that
would-be anonymous readers will seek to purchase the technological capabilities they lack, and
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to associational anonymity); see also Singleton, 428 U.S. at 117-18 (observing that abortion
patient’s desire for anonymity might deter her from asserting her own privacy rights).
that a market for software and services will develop in response to this demand — unless
copyright owners can use the NIICPA to prevent that result.
If the proposed anti-tampering law is unenforceable against so-called “tamperers” who
merely seek to protect their own anonymity, however, it should be equally unenforceable against
individuals who seek to market that capability, and only that capability, to others.  Although
litigants generally may not assert the constitutional rights of third parties, the Supreme Court has
allowed such third-party standing where there are legal or practical obstacles to a direct challenge
by the rights-holder, and where the relationship between the rights-holder and the litigant
“suggests that the third party presumably wishes assertion of the right and that the litigant is
capable of raising it effectively.”208  The Court has recognized that a right of anonymity affords a
particularly compelling justification for third-party standing, because “[t]o require that it be
claimed by the [rights-holders] themselves would result in nullification of the right at the very
moment of its assertion.”209  And it has repeatedly allowed providers of allegedly unlawful
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products or services to raise the rights of their clientele in situations where enforcement of the
challenged law would effectively violate those rights by making the products or services
unavailable.210  Thus, assuming the state action hurdle is surmounted, there is no barrier to this
type of third-party challenge to the NIICPA’s penalty provisions.  If such a challenge succeeded,
“ordinary” readers might then be offered the opportunity to purchase the software or services that
best fit their needs.
VI.
  
CLOSING THE CIRCLE: DESIGNING EFFECTIVE PROTECTION FOR
READER ANONYMITY
Up to this point, I have considered only the implications of government intervention on
the side of copyright owners.  Government intervention in the development of digital copyright
management systems could, of course, assume a very different form.  Rather than penalizing
legitimate and constitutionally protected individual conduct, the government could enact
legislation that would outlaw intrusive, anonymity-destroying practices by copyright owners —
or, at the very least, set strict controls on the permissible uses of reader identifying information. 
Under a law designed to protect the interests of readers as well as copyright owners, “ordinary”
readers would not be forced to depend on judicial findings of state action and third-party
standing, and on the outcome of a war of wits between hackers and developers of copyright
management software, to secure their First Amendment freedoms.
Ample precedent for legislation of this type exists in the form of state and federal statutes
enacted to protect consumer privacy in specific contexts.  States and the federal government have
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§ 10-616(e) (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 397.601-605 (1982) (amended 1996); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 13.40 (West 1988) (amended 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 39-3-365 (1992); MO.
ANN. STAT. §§ 182.815, -.817 (Vernon’s 1986) MONT. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1101 to -1103 (1995);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-712.05(10) (1994) (amended 1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 239.013 (Michie
1996); N.H.
 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 201-D:11; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:73-43.2 (West 1989); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 18-9-4 to -5 (Michie 1978); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 4509 (McKinney 1992); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 125-19 (Michie 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-38-12 (Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 51, § 24A.11 (West 1988); id. tit. 65, § 1-105 (1995); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4428
(1992); R.I.
 
GEN. LAWS § 38-2-2(21) (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 60-4-10 (Law. Co-Op. 1985);
S.D.
 
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 14-2-51 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 10-8-101, -102 (1988); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 317(b)(19) (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-342(B)(8) (Michie Supp. 1994);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.310(1) (West Supp. 1996); W. VA. CODE § 10-1-22 (1995);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 43.30 (West Supp. 1995); WYO. STAT. § 16-4-203(d)(ix) (1977).
enacted legislation to protect the privacy of video rental records211 and cable TV subscription
records.212  Most directly analogous, nearly all states have enacted legislation to protect the
identities of library patrons.213  These context-specific privacy statutes might serve as a starting
point for the design of comprehensive federal legislation to safeguard reader anonymity.
Existing privacy statutes alone afford insufficient protection to readers of digital works,
for three reasons.  First, these statutes, whether federal or state, typically are narrow provisions
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214For a more detailed discussion and critique of these ad hoc, context-specific privacy
statutes, see Reidenberg, supra note l; Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair
Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1996).  Professor
Reidenberg argues that United States legal protection for personal data falls far short of
universally accepted standards, and that the failure to take a comprehensive approach to the
privacy issues raised by collection of personal data is a significant cause of this inadequacy.  See
Reidenberg, supra, at 507-31.
215Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994).  It is unclear whether
the language of this statute covers online video services.  See NTIA
 
PRIVACY REPORT, supra note
14, at 16-17.
216As discussed in note 115, supra, a constitutional right of anonymity may be grounded,
at least partially, in constitutional privacy doctrine.  Anonymity objectives and privacy objectives
overlap substantially.  Nonetheless, the term “anonymity” describes a particularly stringent
variety of “privacy,” and achieving true anonymity, as opposed to mere confidentiality, presents
unique technological and procedural challenges.
designed to protect privacy only in particular contexts.214  Second, the NIICPA casts doubt on the
applicability of even these specific protections in cyberspace.  The example of video rental
records is illustrative.  When a consumer views a video made available by an online video
service, which provision governs — the federal Video Privacy Protection Act, which says that a
“rental” service may not keep or distribute records of that rental,215 or the NIICPA, which
provides safeguards to ensure that the owner of the copyright in the video may do so?
Third, and ultimately most important, although anonymity and privacy are closely related
concepts, statutes enacted to protect privacy do not necessarily serve anonymity concerns.216  The
focus of existing privacy statutes, at least, is on making sure that consumer “personal identifying
information” is not disclosed to unauthorized third parties.  Yet the chilling effect on individual
freedom to read and react to a work arises not only because information about one’s reading
habits might be shared with others, but also because it is collected at all — and because, even if
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217Cf. Smith, supra note 1, at 177 n.l55 (noting that the right of informational privacy
focuses to a significant extent on the conditions for disclosure of personal identifying information
rather than its initial collection).  The DAETC Court appears to have recognized this distinction. 
Cf. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2391 (1996)
(acknowledging constitutionally protected subscriber interest in anonymity), with id. at 2430
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (characterizing fear of chilling effect as “pure hyperbole” given privacy
provisions of statute).  It is worth noting that the voluntary privacy principles set forth in the NII
Privacy Report attempt to raise the threshold for collection of personal data, by stating that
information users should “acquire only that information reasonably expected to support”
activities that are either current or actually planned, and should destroy any information that no
longer satisfies those criteria.  NII
 
PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 45, at II.A., ¶ 9.  However, this
standard is vague and affords no guarantees with respect to anonymity, which may easily be
violated by the collection of such basic personal identifying information as the reader’s name.
218See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(E) (1995) (video rental provider may disclose
information “to any person if the disclosure is incident to the ordinary course of business of the
video tape service provider”); 47 U.S.C. § 551(b)(2)(A) (1995) (cable operator may collect and
use “information necessary to render a cable service or other service provided by the cable
operator to a subscriber”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1354.B.1 (1992) (allowing disclosure of
library rental records “[i]f necessary for the reasonable operation of the library”); N.Y.
 
GEN. BUS.
LAW § 673(3)(c) (McKinney 1996) (allowing disclosure of video tape rental records “to any
person if the disclosure is incident to the ordinary course of business of the video tape service
provider”); see also NII
 
PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 45, at II.A., ¶ 9 (framing data acquisition
guidelines in terms of what is “reasonably expected to support” the collector’s activities); id. at
II.D., ¶¶ 21-23 (defining acceptable uses of personal data in terms of what would be compatible
with individuals’ “objectively reasonable contemplation,” and suggesting that even for some
“incompatible” uses, individual consent may fairly be implied from failure to use opt-out
procedures).  Professor Reidenberg predicts that such exceptions may become “major
loophole[s]” in consumer privacy statutes.  Reidenberg, supra note 214, at 219.
not shared, it might be used by the entity that collected it.217  And the legal interests that justify
overriding some privacy concerns have greatly diminished force where anonymous access to
reading materials is at issue.
Some existing privacy statutes provide that the entity collecting the personal identifying
information may use or disclose that information, as long as such use falls within the ordinary
course of its business.218  In the context of the NIICPA, an “ordinary course of business”
exception would allow a copyright owner to use reader identifying information to monitor
readers’ uses of reading materials they have purchased, particularly if the copyright owner has
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219See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(C) (1995); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1799.3(b)(3), (4) (West
Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-90-119(2)(c) (Supp. 1987); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW
§ 673(2)(a), (c) (McKinney 1988).
220See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1799.3(b)(1) (West Supp. 1996); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 637.5(c) (government agencies only); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-90-119(2)(c) (Supp. 1987).
221See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(F) (1995); N.Y.
 
GEN. BUS. LAW §673(2)(b)
(McKinney 1988).  For example, FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)B) provides that before a litigant may
require a nonparty to disclose a trade secret, it must show “a substantial need for the testimony or
material that cannot otherwise be met without undue hardship.”  Similarly, FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(1) limit the discovery available from a party to matters that are “not privileged.”
Such a “compelling need” threshold could be subject to appropriate exceptions.  Like
other privileged information, information about reading habits should be subject to discovery
when a party has placed it at issue.  For example, a copyright infringement defendant who denies
elected to charge on a per-use basis.  Nor would such an exception necessarily prevent copyright
owners themselves from using reader information to develop accurate customer profiles and then
using those profiles to market other titles to customers.  Thus, for example, one could imagine an
HIV-positive individual who purchases a work on coping with AIDS and, shortly thereafter,
begins to receive marketing literature from the work’s publisher concerning other, similar titles
— along, perhaps, with other promotional literature that tends to suggest that the publisher has
assembled a fairly complete picture of the customer’s tastes and intellectual interests.  The
chilling effect of this conduct might be considerable, but it is not something that existing privacy
statutes were designed to prevent.
Privacy statutes also uniformly allow disclosure of personal identifying information to
law enforcement authorities pursuant to a valid subpoena or warrant,219 and some allow
disclosure in response to civil subpoenas as well.220  Where reader anonymity is concerned, it is
difficult to imagine any justification for allowing routine civil discovery access to this
information.  Civil litigants should be required to make a showing of “compelling need,” as they
must before gaining access to other types of information that are presumptively privileged.221
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ever having seen or heard the plaintiff’s copyrighted work should not be allowed to preclude the
plaintiff from using appropriately tailored discovery requests to investigate the denial.  In
addition, a law privileging reader identifying information should not prevent relevant inquiry
regarding documents read in the course and scope of employment, such as interoffice memos and
reports.
222The rules of evidence in criminal proceedings reflect the heightened protection
accorded to reading.  Even when there is other evidence to support charging a particular
individual with a particular crime, evidence relating to reading habits is inadmissible on the
ultimate question of guilt.  See, e.g., United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1184-95 (9th Cir.)
(evidence of reading habits admissible only to impeach defendant’s contention that his reading
materials showed him to be peaceable), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979); United States v.
McCrea, 583 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1978).
223See Carol M. Ostrom, Unabomber Case Gives Librarians Privacy Fits, SEATTLE
TIMES, May 1, 1996, at Al; Sue O’Brien, Librarian’s Silence Is Golden, DENVER POST, Apr. 21,
1996, at E-01.
224The only reported court opinion to consider a First Amendment challenge to such
disclosure rejected the constitutional arguments out of hand, citing a government interest in fair
and effective law enforcement.  Brown v. Johnston, 328 N.W.2d 510, 512-13 (Iowa 1983), cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 1208 (1983).  Provisions of the federal Video Privacy Protection Act that would
have established privacy rights for library patrons were dropped from the proposed bill after
disagreement arose regarding law enforcement access to circulation records.  S.
 
REP. NO.
100-599, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4342-1, 4342-8.
The question of law enforcement access to information about individual reading habits is
more complicated.  As discussed above, the justification for law enforcement access to
information about digital transactions is substantially weakened when the subject of the inquiry is
the public’s reading habits.222  Nonetheless, reading patterns may sometimes become relevant to
an investigation;223 therefore, complete denial of access to readers’ personal identifying
information is probably infeasible.224 The real question, then, is not whether to allow law
enforcement access to this information, but how much procedural protection to require.
As Professor Freiwald has demonstrated, the level of procedural protection accorded to
digital communications generally has turned on whether the information sought is the content of
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225See Freiwald, supra note 1, at 950-51, 953, 966-75, 994-97.
226See id. at 968 (discussing requirements for access to communication contents under
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968); id. at 970-73 (discussing
requirements for access to stored records reflecting communication attributes under the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986); id. at 995, 1005-07 (discussing requirements
for access to stored records reflecting communication attributes under the Digital Telephony Act
of 1994).
227Professor Freiwald suggests that it should be abandoned, and replaced with strong
protection for all aspects of digital communications.  See Freiwald, supra note 1, at 1006-07,
1013-20.
228See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (1995); Freiwald, supra note 1, at 1014-16.
229See Ostrom, supra note 223; supra pp. 1027-1028.
the communication or some other “communication attribute.”225  To gain access to
communication contents requires a probable cause-based court order, while many stored records
that reveal communication attributes may be easily accessed upon a broad showing of
relevance.226  If this two-tiered approach is retained as the universe of digital communications
expands to include commercial transactions in cyberspace,227 it is not clear how information such
as the title of a purchased work — an item that reveals both the general nature of the
“communication” and its content — would be classified.  The federal Video Privacy Protection
Act imposes a probable cause-based standard for disclosure, and also requires prior notice to the
affected consumer,228 but many other privacy statutes adopt the communication attribute model
for all transaction records.  Where reader anonymity is concerned, the nature of the right at stake
warrants stronger protection.  Reading preexisting copyrighted works — whether online or off —
has no necessary nexus to conduct, and is not the sort of “communication” with which law
enforcement will or should ordinarily be concerned.229
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230See supra p. 994.
231NTIA
 
PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 14, at 25-26 & n.98.  The report contemplates that
consumers will receive a notice of the “opt-out” rule at the start of the relationship.
232NTIA
 
PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 14, at 25-26 & n.98.
233See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93.1 (prohibiting use of a false identity on the
Internet); Ilana DeBare, State Trademark Bill Ignites Net Turmoil, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 2,
1996, at Fl (describing California Senate bill intended to prohibit false use of trademarks on the
Internet); Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 4, 1095 (1996).
234See Burk, supra note 233.
The voluntary “informed consent” system outlined in the NTIA Privacy Report also does
not answer anonymity concerns.230  The report recommends a two-tiered system under which
personal information designated as “sensitive” may be disclosed only if the consumer expressly
“opts in,” but “nonsensitive” information may be disclosed unless the consumer expressly “opts
out.”231  Examples of “sensitive” information include medical records, “sexual matters and
orientation,” personal financial information, and “political persuasion.”232  But where anonymity,
rather than privacy, is the primary concern, the most “sensitive” piece of information is the
consumer’s name.  Viewed through the lens of anonymity, a system that requires consumers
individually to “opt out” of subsequent disclosure of their identities is logically incoherent.
It is possible that citizen concern with reader anonymity might lead individual states to
legislate in the area of online reader anonymity, but less clear what such efforts could
accomplish.  Although several states have attempted to regulate activity in cyberspace, it is
unclear whether states have authority to legislate regarding permissible uses of subscriber data by
online information providers.233  A state’s jurisdiction stops at its boundaries, while the essential
nature of online activity is that it does not.234  Even assuming, however, that the individual states
could validly enact laws designed to protect the anonymity of consumers of digital information,
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235See supra Part III; see also GANDY, supra note 1, at 205-08 (observing that individual
consumers “are contract takers rather than contract makers,” and may not appreciate the
consequences of blanket authorizations to disclose personal data or understand the full range of
possible future costs).
the NIICPA might prevent such laws from having any meaningful effect.  Certainly, a state could
not authorize readers to exercise self-help that the NIICPA expressly prohibits.
A federal statute governing online content providers, in contrast, would create
comprehensive protection for individual readers.  To be most effective, such a law would
prohibit outright the collection of reader identity data.  However, an absolute ban is probably
undesirable and may well be impracticable.  For example, if customers cannot use
anonymous-payor digital cash, online purchases of copyrighted works may necessarily reveal
their identities.  In addition, some customers may want copyright owners to maintain identifying
records — for example, a classical music aficionado who wants to be notified as new digital
recordings become available for purchase, and wants the copyright owner to remember that she
likes instrumental works, but not opera.
More realistically, statutory protection for reader anonymity should recognize that initial
collection of reader identity data may occur, but should require copyright owners to preserve an
anonymous payment option for readers who desire it.  As to those readers who elect a payment
system that entails disclosure of identity, or who elect such disclosure for other reasons, the
statute should erect near-impermeable barriers against aggregation, disclosure, use, and retention
of identifying information for any purpose other than the one(s) the reader has expressly and
specifically authorized.  Such strong pro-reader default rules would counteract the disparities in
bargaining power that exist between readers and copyright owners.235
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236See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(F) (1995); N.Y.
 
GEN. BUS. LAW § 673(2)(b)
(McKinney 1988).
237See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(F) (1995); N.Y.
 
GEN. BUS. LAW § 673(2)(b)
(McKinney 1988).
238See supra p. 1036.
239See supra p. 1035.
First, the statute should forbid disclosure of any reader identifying information to anyone
except law enforcement authorities without the reader’s express, fully informed authorization —
both as to each transaction or category of information disclosed (for example, a purchase of
Bach’s Suites for Unaccompanied Cello or a general preference for classical recordings) and as
to each recipient of that information. The statute should allow civil litigants access to such
information over the reader’s objection only after the affected reader has been given notice and
an opportunity to challenge the subpoena.236  In any such proceeding, the requesting party should
bear the burden of proving that its request is justified.237  As to law enforcement authorities, the
statute should accord reader identifying information the status of communication contents, and
require a probable cause-based court order as a condition of access.238
Second, a statute designed to protect reader anonymity should substantially restrict the
“ordinary course of business” exception that appears in many consumer privacy statutes.239 
Where reading is concerned, the only compelling reason to maintain consumer identity data at all
is that some purchase transactions, such as credit card purchases, may take time to be completed. 
Plainly, when a reader elects to use a credit card, the law should not preclude the copyright owner
from collecting and retaining the information necessary to protect its financial interests in the
transaction in progress.  Absent express, fully informed waiver by the consumer, however, the
statute should prohibit the copyright owner from any other subsequent use of personal identifying
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240See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 551(e) (1995).
241Undoubtedly, some consumers will find a per-transaction waiver requirement annoying
or onerous and wish to execute blanket waivers.  The statute should allow these individuals to do
so, but should afford them the opportunity to revoke such waivers upon request.
information, including aggregation for internal profiling purposes, and should require that the
information be destroyed as soon as payment has been completed.240  Moreover, there should be a
separate waiver, or “opt in,” requirement as to each transaction.241  The value each individual
places on anonymity may vary greatly, depending on the context.  The HIV-positive classical
music buff should not lose his right to read information about HIV and AIDS anonymously
simply because he has asked to be notified when new classical recordings are released.
VII.
  
CONCLUSION
Digital copyright management systems capable of monitoring and charging for every use
of a copyrighted work, no matter how de minimis, are not some remote, futuristic nightmare. 
Prototype systems exist now, and there is every reason to believe that actual systems will begin to
appear online in the very near future.  Once in place, they will enable an unprecedented degree of
intrusion into and oversight of individual decisions about what to read, hear, and view.  Perhaps
the “reader’s paradise” analogy is apt after all; in the digital age, it seems we will all be naked.  In
the face of this development, it is important that we rethink our assumptions about reading — its
nature, its importance, and its relation to the activities of thinking and of speaking one’s
thoughts.  This Article is intended as a first step in that direction.
I have argued that reading is so intimately connected with speech, and so expressive in its
own right, that the freedom to read anonymously must be considered a right that the First
Amendment protects.  To the extent that the NIICPA and the copyright management regime it
enshrines require readers to surrender their anonymity as a condition of access to digital works,
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neither can be considered a legitimate private bargain between copyright owners and readers. 
Arguably, the provisions of the NIICPA that would give private copyright management systems,
and private copyright management decisions, the force of law amount to unconstitutional state
action, and could not be enforced against readers who tamper with copyright management
systems solely to preserve their own anonymity or the anonymity of others.  A far better solution,
however, would be for Congress to recognize the implications of the new copyright management
technologies for readers, and rethink the private copyright management regime it is on the verge
of approving.  As one of the “rules of the road” for the digital age, Congress should extend to all
readers comprehensive protection against anonymity-destroying practices adopted by copyright
owners.
